


JPRS-UWE-86-003

11 February 1986

USSR Report

WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No. 11, November 1985



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal **MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA** published in Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS No 11

Russian title : MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE
OTNOSHENIYA

Author(s) :

Editor(s) : Ya.S. Khavinson

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo TsK KPSS "Pravda"

Place of publication : Moscow

Date of publication : November 1985

Signed to press : 16 Oct 85

Copies : 27,000

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye
otnosheniya", 1985

ENGLISH SUMMARY OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11,
Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 158-159

[Text] I. Frolov in the article "Great October and Fates of World Civilization" states that the Great October socialist revolution initiated a new era--an epoch of construction of socialism and communism. It represents the pivotal event of the 20th century, the onset of a principally new stage in the development of human civilization. A revolutionary leap has taken place in the history of world civilization, the importance and scale of which is continuously growing. This is clearly seen against the background of new phenomena and events determining the new direction of development of civilization. The new stage of the scientific and technological revolution, combined with qualitative changes, primarily with microelectronics, informations, biotechnology, exploration of space generates global social problems which accordingly will predetermine the future of world civilization. These new conditions of life and development of humanity give rise to new technological forms of world civilization upon which to a great extent depend their social, human and ecological characteristics. The author poses the question how social factors today are influencing the main directions in which world civilization is developing. The article criticizes the utopian and other concepts of the Western politologists concerning the perspectives of development of world civilization.

A. Vasilyev in the article "Program of Aggression in Space" analyzes the American so-called strategic defense initiative research program (SDI) proclaimed by President R. Reagan in March 1983. The author shows that SDI is a result of Washington's longterm efforts, initiated in the first postwar years with the aim of attaining military superiority over the USSR. The author gives an estimation of the cost of SDI including the money already spent on working out various parts of the system. The article shows that in most cases the level of work has of late outgrown "pure research", so Washington's claims to the effect that SDI is no more than a "research" program do not correspond with reality. The article notes that the realization of the SDI program is closely linked with Washington's course of undermining the Soviet-American treaty, concluded in 1972 to limit antiballistic missile systems. The article considers it inadmissible to militarize space and stresses that urgent efforts are needed to prevent this extremely dangerous new direction of arms race.

The article "World Security. Ways of Enhancing Effectiveness of United Nations" by Yu. Tomilin analyzes the activity of the United Nations during the forty years its existence. It points out the constructive role of the USSR in drafting the UN Charter and its contribution to the work of this organization. For forty years the UN Charter has been an instrument of peace. Such principles as the equality and self-determination of peoples, nonuse of force in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another are laid in the UN Charter as a law of international life and have gained universal recognition. The article lays special stress on the principle of consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council in taking decisions in the main issues. In forty years the UN has become an inseparable part of the system of international relations, the central link of a number of international organizations. The UN today is a unique forum of multilateral diplomacy where the states are able to lay down their views on international issues and find ways and means to solve them. The article speaks about the tasks of the organization as an instrument of peace which has to take further steps for the just and democratic principles on which the United Nations has been founded to become firmly established in international relations. This is especially relevant today as humankind now has a common enemy--the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

The article "Small West European Countries in World Policy" by L. Voronkov considers the qualitative changes taking place in present international relations because of the struggle of the two opposing social systems and the political, military, economic and social factors which give more opportunities for the so-called small West-European countries to carry out their independent foreign policy geared at defending their people's interests and more actively participating in the solution of important world problems. The author considers the trends in policy common for this group of countries and advances arguments to prove how these countries' foreign policy, provided it contributes to detente, is instrumental to their national security. As for the USSR the relations with the small West-European countries have always played and are still playing an important role. Steadily following the principles of peaceful coexistence the Soviet Union is seeking to maintain a new type of international relations based on equality and mutually beneficial economic, political and cultural cooperation with them. All this contributes to the gradual exclusion from the practice of international relations the policy of strength methods, used by imperialism. The consistent policy of the USSR and other socialist states in support of the principles of peaceful coexistence enables the small West-European countries to carry out a truly independent policy.

The mounting role of multinational business has become a noticeable phenomenon during the post-war period, especially during the two recent decades. In the early 1980's annual sales of the top transnational corporations (350) accounted for 28 percent of the aggregate GNP of the nonsocialist world. Multinational dimensions of capitalist business has led to the international flows of technology, to the expansion of R&D carried out overseas. Yu. Adzhubey in the article "Transnational Corporations and the Technological Potential of the Capitalist Countries" tackles the tricky question of the implications, stemming from the transnationalization of R&D, the effects of the

technology transfer upon the technological performance of the donor and recipient countries. The author presumes that the TNC's exert significant impact on the rates, structure and efficiency of R&D performed elsewhere, moderating and canalizing the international diffusion of innovations, stipulating the forms of the innovative process in various countries. The main causes that have brought about the transnationalization of R&D are highlighted, the contemporary configuration, scales and scope of overseas R&D are presented. TNC's expand R&D in foreign countries striving to exploit the opportunities of foreign R&D bodies and personnel. On the other hand, local markets and the particulars of demand on the international marketplace present a specific challenge for R&D within the transnational business structure. Let alone these factors, one must take into consideration the development of the international division of labor within the TNC. The author examines the peculiarities of the technology transfer between the related and non-related companies in the international context, makes the subsequent comparisons. The analysis of the international technology transfer provided for the substantiated conclusions, concerning the actual effect of technology flows on the technological performance of the recipient countries, on the overall efficiency of R&D efforts, accounting for both positive and negative aspects. The author concludes with the comments on the TNC's influence on the macroeconomic parameters of the donor countries, outlining the contradictory forms that characterize the relationship of TNC's and national states in the sphere of modern science and technology.

The article "Problems of Economic Cooperation and Integration of Developing Countries" by A. Kodachenko refers to present-day problems of economic cooperation and integration of the developing countries. The author by citing rich factual data analyzes the pre-conditions, specific characteristics and main trends of the economic cooperation of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which are beginning to take shape. The author reveals the progressive, anti-imperialist potential of such cooperation, aimed at the acceleration of the rate of socio-economic progress of the developing countries and the creation by them of an independent national economy. The article shows that obstacles and difficulties of cooperation and integration of such countries are arising mainly due to capitalist methods and forms of cooperation applied. Capitalist methods and forms of integration can not solve vital problems of such countries. Hence the need to change them. The further development of economic cooperation and integration of the developing countries presupposes a gradual evolution of methods and means of their realization. But no matter how the concrete methods, forms and scope of this process differ all of them invariably presuppose a consistent struggle against imperialism and internal reaction, for democratic development and social progress. It is evident today that the trends of economic cooperation of the developing countries is a vital and perspective process.

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/9869

CSO: 1816/03

SDI TECHNOLOGIES, FINANCING DISCUSSED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 14-23

[Article by A. Vasilyev: "Program for Aggression in Space"]

[Text] The question of the United States' creation and deployment in space of assault arms, as a basic component of a broad-based BMD system with space-based elements included, has become a most important factor seriously complicating the current international situation. This system has a perfectly definite aggressive thrust concealed by talk about the "exploratory nature" of the work being performed and the "salutary influence" which it will allegedly exert in time on the solution of the problem of reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability.

The very formulation of the question of the deployment of broad-based antimissile defenses caused stormy debate in connection with their political, military-strategic and economic consequences. However, despite the wave of criticism within the United States, in the allied countries and throughout the world, the present administration continues to adhere to the plans to create a new class of arms. Washington's measures in this sphere are assuming an increasingly definite nature. It is a question not of an "idea" but of a perfectly specific system, work on which is being embodied in perfectly specific organizational forms. What is to be the appearance of such a system, what is the state of its development, is not the disquiet being expressed in connection with its creation premature? For an answer to these questions it is essential to turn to an analysis of the content, organization, financing and progress of the work on the giant program of the so-called "strategic defense initiative" (SDI), on whose realization the United States has embarked.¹

I

The program geared to the creation of an antimissile defense system with space echelons was announced by President R. Reagan on 23 March 1983 in his well-known speech which subsequently came to be called the "star wars speech". The corresponding NSC Directive 6-83 on the start of work on realization of the "new defense concept" was signed by the President 2 days later--on 25 March. But if we are to speak of its true sources, we have to turn to a considerably earlier period.

The "father" of the antimissile defense program is former Hitler general Walther (Walter) Dornberger, who in 1947 arrived in the United States straight from an internment camp in Great Britain and was simultaneously taken on in two positions--Defense Department adviser and Air Force consultant.² He straightaway came out with a report on the need for the creation of an attack space arms system which would incorporate satellites carrying atom bombs and an antimissile system consisting of a multitude of satellites equipped with missiles. It may be considered that this idea, whose aggressive nature is not in doubt, has survived to our day and has been incorporated in a section of the SDI program which has acquired the title "Weapons of Great Kinetic Energy Destroying a Target Upon Collision" or, in short, kinetic weapons.

At the start of the 1950's the United States embarked on work on a project for intercepting missiles in the boost phase of the trajectory (which came to be called BAMBI)--a direct forerunner of a principal branch of the SDI program.³ The development began in 1955 and the full-scale designing in 1966 of a ground-based ABM system based on Nike (Nike-Zeus and later Nike-X) nuclear missiles. At the end of the 1950's the United States embarked on research for the purpose of the military use, within an ABM system included, of elementary particle beams. Work on other components of the program for the creation of so-called directed-energy weapons (DEW)--laser weapons--began shortly after the invention of lasers and the discovery of ways of increasing their capacity. The first mentions in the press of the development of laser weapons appeared at the start of the 1960's.⁴

Work on a number of ABM systems and individual elements continued with a growing level of appropriations right up to the start of the 1970's. The conclusion in 1972 of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty compelled a cutback in the financing and, correspondingly, the volume of this work, but there was no question of it being suspended.

By the end of J. Carter's term in the White House the United States had accumulated great experience of developments in the sphere of various ABM technologies. True, the administration at that time adopted a quite guarded attitude toward the prospects of a new round of the arms race and was more critical in its assessment of its consequences. Thus, according to Defense Secretary H. Brown, "...the prospects of a technical solution of the problem of the preservation of present-day society in the face of a thermonuclear war with the aid of space-based BMD laser systems... do not appear to me to be very convincing. The efforts aimed at achieving such technical potential, on the other hand, could in themselves be extraordinarily dangerous if they create the illusion that a solution has been obtained or, probably, may be obtained."⁵

Thus work on the scientific-technical process stock for broad-based antimissile defenses has proceeded continuously, and many billions of dollars have been spent to this end. The SDI program emerged by no means in a void, and the phase at which its realization begins has already progressed quite far in respect of all elements of an antimissile defense from the stage which it is customary to call basic research (and which this program is allegedly still at). What was needed was the political decision on the practical use, contrary to current international accords, of the results which had been obtained.

Extreme-right conservatives were constantly suggesting to the U.S. Government the need for a revision and, sometimes, complete renunciation of the ABM Treaty. Their demands undoubtedly influenced the incorporation in the Republican Party's election platform, which was published in the summer of 1980, of the appeal for "energetic R&D in the antimissile defense sphere."⁶

The first indications that the R. Reagan administration was viewing the idea of "strategic defense" in the practical plane may be found in the well-known "strategic arms modernization" program announced by the President on 2 October 1981. A White House explanatory memorandum thereto said that among the "priority" measures is "energetic expanded R&D in the antimissile defense sphere, including the development of the technology for the corresponding space-based systems." A few months later, on 21 June 1982, the U.S. Air Force announced the creation as of 1 September of a space command, while on 4 July the White House issued a directive on national space policy.⁷

On 23 March 1983 President R. Reagan delivered on television the above-mentioned "star wars speech". On 30 November 1983 he convened the first meeting with the participation of NSC members devoted to problems of the creation of a broad-based antimissile defense system and on 6 January 1984 he signed the NSC directives on R&D on the future BMD system adopted in development of Directive 6-83. The initial stage of formation of the SDI program was thereby practically completed. It remained to appoint its leader. Lt Gen J. Abrahamson became such on 16 April 1984.⁸

II

According to numerous American publications, it is anticipated that the broad-based BMD system will consist of several "layers"--echelons of the interception of ballistic missiles (interception of the missiles in the boost phase of their trajectory, in the interim phase and in the reentry phase⁹). Great importance is attached to interception in the initial--boost--phase of flight inasmuch as it is believed that it is here that the missile is most vulnerable and, at the same time, that the destruction of a single missile signifies the neutralization all at once of several warheads. The division of the BMD system into "layers" is quite provisional since the actual arms systems incorporated therein could have overlapping spheres of action.

The formulated echeloning outline presupposes the use of various technical facilities within the framework of this defense "layer" or the other. The use mainly of "exotic" types of weapons--laser or beam--is envisaged at the first stage, when the missile accelerates thanks to the operation of the engines of its stages (whence it is called the "acceleration" or "boost" phase of the flight). Two forms of their basing are being explored: laser or beam weapons accommodated on space platforms revolving in circumterrestrial orbit or ground-based laser installations, whose radiation is directed toward the targets with the aid of orbital mirrors.

At the end of this stage and in the interim phase of the flight the enumerated facilities are joined by a further two types of arms: X-ray laser activated by a nuclear explosion and kinetic weapons. There is a sharp increase here (tens of times) in the number of targets, which is connected with the separation of

the last stages of the rockets and their division into individual warheads, and also the use of a large number of so-called "decoys"--devices imitating warheads. It is proposed accommodating the X-ray lasers on ballistic missiles based mainly on submarines. On command the missiles are to put the laser devices in space, where they are guided toward the warheads in flight, after which the nuclear devices are exploded. Before being destroyed by the explosion, the lasers are to have emitted a powerful burst of X-radiation toward the targets. Kinetic weapons--a broad class of arms of varied building incorporating self-guiding missiles and so-called "electrodynamic acceleration of matter"--are devices wherein the missile is accelerated on a railgun with the aid of a powerful electromagnetic field.

At the end of the interim phase it is contemplated adding to the enumerated interception facilities new types of kinetic weapons, ground-based on this occasion. Among these are, for example, "transatmospheric" interception weapons.¹⁰

In the final phase of entry into the dense layers of the atmosphere the decoys, approaching an altitude of 15 kilometers, begin to fall behind the warheads, which facilitates interception somewhat. However, the extremely short length of flight time in this phase, on the other hand, sharply complicates the task. At this stage the main role is to be performed by low-altitude intercept missiles of the LOAD type.¹¹

Even a brief survey of a BMD system with space-based elements points to the particularly important role which technical facilities serving to detect and identify targets and control combat operations are called on to perform. Very limited time practically precluding the possibility of man's participation in their control is assigned all operations.¹²

The structure of the SDI program also has been built in accordance with the outline of the system:

1. Detection, lock-on, tracking and assessment of damage to the targets.
2. DEW.
3. Kinetic weapons.
4. Systems analysis and battle management.
5. Support R&D.

The development of means of detection, lock-on, tracking and assessment of damage to the targets is aimed at the creation of individual elements of the future antimissile defenses for tackling the above tasks at all stages of the flight of the ballistic missiles. Within the framework of this field it is planned creating facilities capable of providing for:

the tracking on a global scale of all potentially threatening objects launched by ballistic missiles with determination of their location, speed and other characteristics;

the collection and processing of signals and data necessary for the choice of targets and establishing the fact of destruction and also for notifying the command post on a realistic time scale;

the choice of targets for the weapon delivery system platforms with this information being conveyed to the command post.

The list of the most important work in this field includes laser and radar target-identification equipment, systems for tracking the targets in the boost phase and in space and so forth.

A principal direction of the SDI program is the creation of DEW. The official statements in Congress of Pentagon representatives on this question coincide textually virtually in full and do not disclose details. Some American publications connect this with the insufficient development of the DEW and the great degree of uncertainty in respect of the creation of future antimissile weapons in this direction.

Independent R&D pertaining to DEW has been conducted for a number of years now, besides the military department and the Department of Energy, by individual major companies (TRW, Lockheed, Hughes Aircraft and so forth), which have concluded contracts with the Pentagon or are hoping to obtain such in the future, and also a number of laboratories. The list of basic work with respect to this section includes ground- and space-based laser systems, space-based beam weapons and X-ray lasers.

Kinetic weapons include the use of both missiles and superhigh-speed projectiles. In particular, a number of American publications points out that electrodynamic accelerators of matter could be created in the comparatively near future. The Westinghouse firm has developed an experimental model of such a weapon, for example, lacking, it is true, the necessary rate of fire and multicharge nature.

Systems analysis and battle management demands the exceptionally rapid processing of a variety of data when conducting combat operations in space. This presupposes primarily hardware for a control and communications system under combat conditions which possesses such qualities as high sensitivity, enhanced reliability, survivability and many others. Inasmuch as the modeling of situations forms the basis of verification of these qualities, the need for the development of simulation facilities, including a vast amount of software, is declared the priority task.

Judging by the material which is being published, the appearance of such a system is not as yet discernible in practice. What is evidently required is a computer with a speed of operation hundreds-thousands of times superior to the level that has been achieved with a malfunction-free operating time of many years. Such computers must have reliable protection against the radiation, heat and mechanical influence characteristic of a nuclear attack. For this reason it is possible that part of the computer would have to be put into space, including remote areas of the distance between the Earth and the Moon. The creation of reliable software protected against all kinds of interference and accidents could prove a highly costly and complex task.

Support R&D presupposes research in the sphere of the future weapons systems' energy requirements, determination of the possible survivability of the new delivery systems and so forth.

III

The program for the creation of a broad-based BMD system will, to judge by everything, be the most costly in the history of U.S. military organizational development. It is clear that a comprehensive analysis of its economic aspects has to take into consideration the expenditure already made prior to the official organizational structuring of administration of the program. A full estimate thereof is an extraordinarily difficult task inasmuch as there is now no chance of examining all the "peripeteias" of the prehistory of the SDI. However, it is possible to make a rough estimate. Included here is the expenditure on "conventional" ABM systems based on the use of ABM interceptor-missiles, antimissile launchers and radar stations, expenditure on the development of DEW and expenditure on the construction and maintenance of proving grounds and the creation of control and communications systems.

With regard for the allowances made above the cost of the work in the sphere of "conventional" antimissile defenses from the start of the research through the 1984 fiscal year constituted \$4.1 billion.¹³ A further \$1 billion spent on the operation of the experimental firing range of Kwajalein Atoll need to be added here. The sum total of Pentagon spending on DEW is already in excess of \$3 billion. Spending on control and communications systems, on the other hand, is carefully concealed in different items of the military budget. However, it may confidently be claimed that it is very high. In particular, this applies to the development of a variety of specialized computers. Thus, for example, in the 1980 fiscal year appropriations merely for the software for such computers constituted \$4.4 billion.¹⁴ A considerable proportion of the said outlays may be attributed to expenditure on systems for controlling a broad-based antimissile defense and its elements.

Large-scale resources have also been invested in other types of "multipurpose" equipment. The ASAT antisatellite weapon system developed by the Vought Company may serve as a typical example. Prior to the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Vought Company had been carrying out work connected with the creation of antimissile arms. Following the conclusion of the treaty it switched to the development of the ASAT system, which is strikingly similar to the ABM elements which had been developed earlier. Attention was called to this similarity by, inter alia, the Congressional Research Service in 1979.¹⁵ More than \$2 billion have been spent on the development of this type of armament all told. It is significant that the Vought Company was among the first to declare its readiness to participate in the SDI program, justifying this by the fact that it had already made substantial investments in preliminary independent research.

Large-scale, albeit carefully concealed, expenditure has been made by other concerns also in the hope of profitable contracts in the future. According to the leader of the SDI program, "many companies... are spending part of their own resources, up to \$30 million a year for the biggest of them, to solve individual SDI problems."¹⁶

As a whole, the majority of experts is skeptical toward the official data on spending on an antimissile defense already made by the United States and agrees that its real amount is several times higher.¹⁷ In particular, according to estimates of the Federation of American Scientists, in the period from the start of work (usually put at 1954) through R. Reagan's "star wars" speech \$40 billion have been spent in the country on military research in the sphere of antimissile defenses of all types. For comparison the table adduces data on the cost of a number of major projects carried out in the United States.

Comparative Cost of Certain Major Projects

	<u>Cost* (\$, billions)</u>
SDI (1984-1993)	60
All military research in the sphere of antimissile defense (1954-1983)	40
The assault aircraft carrier group (purchases)	17
The Manhattan Project	15
The Space Shuttle program (aggregate development cost)	10

* In constant prices of the 1985 fiscal year.

Source: J. Pike, "The Strategic Defense Initiative. Budget and Program," 10 February, 1985, p 1.

As is known, having encountered the negative attitude of many of the country's specialists and public figures toward the President's "initiative," in June 1983 the U.S. Administration formed two interdepartmental groups of experts to substantiate the "new strategy". One of them--the group studying defense technology (it was headed by former NASA Administrator J. Fletcher)--proposed four different versions of the financing of the program.

The first version was drawn up on the basis of the earliest possible time of the deployment of the future BMD system. The speed of its realization would be limited only by technical problems. According to this version, in the period 1985-1989 appropriations were to constitute \$27 billion, and in the period up to the year 2000, when the first echelon of the system could have been deployed, some \$92-94 billion. The second version envisaged that in the period 1985-1989 some \$26 billion would be needed, while the third required \$20 billion. Finally, the fourth ("limited") version outlined the allocation in 1985-1989 of \$18 billion.¹⁸

Today a sum total of \$26 billion, associating it with complete outlays, is usually mentioned when speaking of the impending expenditure on the program. But it by no means shows the entire sum of appropriations and emerged rather as a consequence of the budget process adopted in the Pentagon.¹⁹ In fact, however, at the initial stage (up to the first half of the 1990's inclusive) the cost of the development of the SDI program is to constitute approximately \$70-90 billion (in 1985 prices).

Study of the structure of the appropriations makes it possible to say that the sharp growth thereof is determined by the emphasis on the full-scale development, production and testing of experimental product models. As of the 1986 fiscal year it is planned spending over 70-80 percent of all allocated resources to this end.²⁰

IV

Two stages are clearly distinguished in Washington's actions aimed at undermining the Treaty Limiting ABM Systems. The first was characterized by "nonacceptance" of the treaty without special justification or alternative ideas. At this stage the main driving force was the desire to break off any accords with the USSR curbing the United States' buildup of its own strategic potential. Thus on the threshold of the Soviet-American meeting set for 1982 to examine the progress of compliance with the treaty the U.S. Administration was evidently close to making an attempt to revise it. This, in particular, was indicated by an explanatory note made public by the White House in October 1981 in connection with the strategic arms modernization program.

The second stage began shortly after the above-mentioned R. Reagan speech. Having encountered a sharp reaction to its "initiative" both within the country and overseas, the government changed tactics, declaring support for the ABM Treaty. However, inasmuch as it continued to serve as an impediment to the realization of its plans the Washington administration resorted to a flanking maneuver incorporating on the one hand accusations against the USSR of "violations" of the treaty and, on the other, a distorted interpretation of a number of its provisions. Thus the United States asserts that the SDI program is of a purely "research" nature and for this reason does not come under the limitations contained in various treaties to which it subscribes. This argument has already been subjected to justified criticism repeatedly.²¹

Recognition of the objective nature of the interconnection between offensive and defensive strategic arms led to the conclusion in 1972 of the Treaty Limiting ABM Systems and simultaneously made possible the signing of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Sphere of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Speaking of the treaty's significance, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, observed that "merely its existence afforded a prospect of further steps" in the sphere of negotiations of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.²²

The facts testify that in having embarked in practice on work to create a broad-based BMD system with space-based elements Washington has adopted a policy of undermining the ABM Treaty.

The SDI program is a result of the foreign policy course of the present administration and its line aimed at breaking up the existing military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and acquiring military superiority. The program reflects an endeavor to impart to the arms race a long-term nature and create a giant field of new military developments whose fruit may in the future be employed in the most unexpected areas, opening increasingly new channels of the arms race.

The possible military-strategic and international-political costs of the creation of a BMD space system and the scale of potential expenditure thereon are so considerable that this problem has given rise to acute debate in political circles and among scientists and specialists in many states. In the United States a negative attitude toward the plans to deploy strike weapons, antimissile included, in space has been expressed by such authoritative organizations as the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists and the Association of Arms Control Supporters and the most prominent scientists and specialists of a number of the country's colleges and research centers. Many of them have also noted that the United States has no chance of acquiring superiority over the Soviet Union, considering its achievements in the corresponding spheres of science and technology.

Even prior to the start of the negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and space arms a whole number of studies drew attention to the complication of the process of the achievement of an accord on a halt to the arms race on Earth and the prevention thereof in space in connection with the development of work on the SDI program. The negative impact of the consequences on the prospects for the peaceful use of space in the interests of all mankind was noted.²³

To neutralize the arguments of the opponents of a broad-based antimissile defense the U.S. Administration circulated arguments emphasizing the "peaceful," "purely defensive" nature of the "research" within the SDI framework. It should be noted that the proposition according to which a broad-based BMD system is not designed for offensive operations against ground targets, as, equally, the argument that "nothing terrible will happen" if the system is activated owing to an error in its computers, is relatively new. But this does not make it more plausible. Thus the U.S. Air Force Manual points out plainly: "...The growing importance of space operations is leading to the possibility of space-to-space and space-to-Earth military operations." And also: "...Our potential for controlling space will ensure freedom of movement on Earth and in the atmosphere."

Essentially the main political purpose of the SDI program, albeit carefully concealed by the U.S. Administration, is to block the sole realistic way out of the dangerous situation which has come about as a result of the nuclear arms race spurred by Washington--a reduction in nuclear arms based on the principle of equality and equal security as far as their complete destruction.

The way to prevent a new, extraordinarily dangerous round of the arms race includes a halt to all work on the creation of space-based strike systems, a ban on the deployment in space of all weapons capable of hitting in space, airspace or on Earth this target or the other and a ban on the use of force in space and from space in respect of the Earth altogether. These measures have been reflected in proposals which have been and continue to be put forward by the Soviet Union.

Two draft treaties submitted by the USSR banning the deployment in space of weapons of any kind (1981) and banning the use of force in space and from space in respect of the Earth (1983) are currently on the negotiating table of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

At the initiative of the USSR in December 1984 the UN General Assembly 39th Session examined the question "The Use of Space Solely for Peaceful Purposes, for the Good of Mankind". It passed by an absolute majority of 150 votes (only the United States failed to support this resolution) a resolution calling on states to exclude space from the sphere of the arms race and refrain in their space activity from the threat or the use of force.

In August 1985 the Soviet Union proposed study at the anniversary, 40th, session of the UN General Assembly of the draft document which it had submitted--"Basic Directions and Principles of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Conquest of Space Under the Conditions of its Nonmilitarization".

Unfortunately, the USSR's proposals in this sphere are coming up against the blank wall erected by the U.S. Administration. In addition, numerous statements of officials, including the President himself, have emphasized repeatedly that under no circumstances will the United States abandon the plans to realize the SDI.

New examples of Washington's negative response to the Soviet peace initiatives are its superfast refusal to follow the example of the USSR, which announced the imposition as of 6 August 1985 of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, and also the Pentagon's first combat test on 13 September of an antisatellite weapon--the ASAT system--against an actual target in space. Both these facts are directly connected with implementation of the SDI program.

The United States' testing of an antisatellite system signifies nothing other than actions leading directly to the start of the deployment of a new class of dangerous weapons--strike space weapons. One further step has been taken in escalation of the arms race and its extension to space. And it has been taken despite the fact that in August 1986 the Soviet Union unilaterally undertook not to put antisatellite systems in space.

Addressing the French Parliament on 3 October, M.S. Gorbachev announced new wide-ranging initiatives of the USSR. Paramount among them was the proposal addressed to the United States for an understanding to be arrived at fully banning for both sides strike space arms and a truly radical, 50-percent, reduction in their nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. In combination with the Soviet Union's preceding actions its new initiatives represent a set of constructive and realistic measures whose implementation would lead to a genuine breakthrough in international relations to the benefit of peace, security and cooperation between peoples.

FOOTNOTES

1. Strictly speaking, the SDI is not a program but a conglomerate of programs.
2. In Hitler's "Third Reich" Dornberger was in charge of the work on the creation of rockets at the testing ground in Peenemuende. In March 1939, together with his closest assistant, Werner von Braun (who subsequently held a leading position among American rocket designers), he accompanied Hitler

during his "tour" of the base. The direct result of their activity, which had gained the Fuehrer's approval, was the bombardment of London and Antwerp with the V-1 and V-2 rockets.

3. For the initial stage of the United States' work on ABM projects see, for example, J. Manno, "Arming the Heavens," New York, 1984.
4. There are reports that in 1959 even the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency had concluded a contract for research in the sphere of the creation of powerful lasers with one company (See J. Hecht, "Beam Weapons. The Next Arms Race," New York, 1984, p 23)
5. H. Brown, "Thinking About National Security. Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World," Boulder (Color.), 1983, p 52.
6. See NATIONAL JOURNAL, 26 July 1980, p 1223.
7. The Pentagon officially announced that as of 23 September 1985 a new U.S. space command headquarterd in Colorado Springs would begin operation. It has been set up on the personal instructions of President R. Reagan and will be directly subordinate to the U.S. defense secretary and the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
8. Formerly a member of the team of astronauts, but did not make a single space flight, then the participant in a number of projects for the creation of various types of arms--the Maverick air-to-ground guided missile and the F-16 fighter--and, finally, leader of the Space Shuttle manned flights program in NASA.
9. A further "layer"--the flight phase of the missile from the time of the completion of acceleration through the time of separation of the individual warheads. Henceforward this phase is associated with the first phase.
10. Such a device was demonstrated on 10 June 1984, when an interceptor launched from the Kwajalein (Marshall Islands) firing range on a Minuteman 1 missile destroyed the warhead of a Minuteman 1 missile which had been launched from the Vandenberg AFB (California).
11. The development of this system had been under way in the United States since the start of the 1970's. It was intended to protect the positions of the MX ICBM given a mobile basing mode.
12. The latter circumstance is a subject of heated debate between the supporters and opponents of Reagan's "initiative". In particular, during discussion in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 1984 its then chairman--Sen C. Percy--recalling the "alarming number of documented malfunctions in the computers of the North American ABM system (NORAD)," asked: "How profound, do you think, would be the crisis in which we would find ourselves were the United States' computer-controlled space defense system to

mistakenly destroy a Soviet rocket carrying cosmonauts?" Percy did not obtain a convincing answer from the President's scientific adviser, G. Keyworth, to whom the question was addressed ("Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 98th Congress 2d Session, April 25, 1984," p 59).

13. Estimated from "Fiscal Year 1985 Arms Control Impact Statements," March 1984, Washington, p 209.
14. See SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA IDEOLOGIYA No 4, 1985, p 115.
15. See AEROSPACE DAILY, 11 January 1979, pp 50-81.
16. GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE, September 1984, p 13.
17. It should be considered, in particular, that the Pentagon is not the sole body spending resources in this sphere. Appropriations for the development of an X-ray laser activated by a nuclear explosion have been allocated from the budget of the Department of Energy; a large amount of work on means of putting weapons in orbit, control systems and a variety of transmitters has been performed by NASA and so forth.
18. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 17 October 1983, pp 17-18.
19. See AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 24 October 1983, p 15, which points out directly that it is a question of expenditure only up to the 1989 fiscal year.
20. See J. Pike,: "The Strategic Defense Initiative. Budget and Program," 10 February 1985, p 8.
21. See A. Arbatov, "Limiting Antimissile Systems--Problems, Lessons, Prospects" (SShA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 12, 1984); Ye. Velikhov, A. Kokoshin, "Nuclear Weapons and Problems of International Security" (MEMO No 4, 1985).
22. PRAVDA, 4 June 1985.
23. See "Strategic and International-Political Consequences of the Creation of a Space-Based Antimissile System Using Directed-Energy Weapons," Report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, Moscow, 1984.

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CSO: 1816/03

UNITED NATIONS' LACK OF IMPACT ON ARMS CONTROL BLAMED ON U.S.

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 24-35

[Article by Yu. Tomilin: "International Security and Ways of Enhancing the Effectiveness of the United Nations"]

[Excerpt] The United Nations appeared simultaneously with the onset of the nuclear age. Only 3 weeks separate the day of the signing of its charter-- 26 June--from the first atomic explosion carried out by the United States at the Alamogordo firing range on 16 July. The perfectly understandable absence in the text of the charter of a mention of nuclear weapons does not, however, alter in the least the irrefutable fact that this document corresponded fully at that time and now corresponds to the realities of the era which came to be called nuclear and now nuclear-space. The charter's provisions pertaining to the prevention of war, the nonuse of force and disarmament provide the necessary foundation for the development of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the nonuse of nuclear weapons, a lowering of the level of nuclear arms and so forth.

The first General Assembly resolution, which established the Atomic Energy Commission (1946), even envisaged that the writ of the latter was to encompass the development of proposals "concerning the exclusion of atomic weapons from national armaments".* The resolution passed the same year on the principles determining general arms regulation and reduction categorized this task as an "urgent goal".**

Throughout the 40 years of the United Nations' existence the examination of questions of arms limitation and disarmament has been a principal area of its activity. The creation of the Atomic Energy Commission initiated the formation of a mechanism which, supplementary to the General Assembly, was to provide the necessary organizational-procedural framework for the detailed study and solution of disarmament questions.

This mechanism was subsequently developed considerably. Committees, subcommittees, commissions, subcommissions and so forth were created, disbanded,

* UN General Assembly Resolution 1 (1), 24 January 1946.

** UN General Assembly Resolution 2.41 (1), 14 December 1946.

merged and separated. The mechanism became increasingly ramified and complex. Currently it represents an entire system of bodies, in which various disarmament issues are discussed and studied, the texts of agreements and other documents are drawn up and all kinds of auxiliary functions are performed. It should, however, be noted that the effectiveness of this huge mechanism, if compared with the quantity and significance of the agreements and accords in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament which are drawn up and coordinated within its framework, is still very low. Of course, it is not a question of this shortcoming or imperfection or the other of the given mechanism here. The real reason for the lack of tangible progress in the disarmament sphere is the position of the Western states and also the tension which is being spurred through their fault.

However, the results which nonetheless have been achieved in the sphere of arms limitation, mainly in the 1960's-1970's, should not be belittled. The following agreements have been developed and coordinated within the framework of the UN system and in the Geneva Disarmament Committee (since 1984 the Disarmament Conference): the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Treaty Banning the Deployment on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in its Interior of Nuclear Weapons and Other Types of Weapon of Mass Destruction; the Treaty on the Principles of States' Activity in the Exploration and Use of Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the Convention Banning the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on the Destruction of the Stockpiles Thereof; the Convention Banning the Military or any Other Hostile Use of Means of Influencing the Natural Environment; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; and the Convention Banning or Limiting the Use of Certain Types of Conventional Weapons Which Could Be Considered To Cause Excessive Injury and Have an Indiscriminate Effect. In addition, the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Space and Under Water was concluded to a considerable extent as a result of the discussion at international forums, within the UN framework included, of the question of banning nuclear tests. These international agreements created limitations in some areas of the arms race to a certain extent and contributed to the consolidation of detente.

It would be wrong, however, to measure the useful effect of UN activity only by the number of agreements in the disarmament sphere elaborated within its framework. Of course, the implementation of practicable, tangible measures to limit arms should be the end result of all efforts exerted in various UN bodies. At the same time the fact that the organization is contributing to the shaping of public opinion in support of disarmament, helping determine the general directions of the efforts in this sphere, permitting a comparison of the positions of different states, contributing to their rapprochement and thereby making a tangible contribution to a general improvement in the international situation is important also.

Taking as a basis the recommendations in support of this disarmament measure or the other adopted in the UN bodies, the most commonsensical circles in the capitalist countries can influence the governments more effectively, overcome the resistance of the reactionary forces and the military-industrial complex

and thereby influence the shaping of their states' positions on disarmament issues. The activity of the UN mechanism is contributing to the enlistment of an increasingly broad range of countries in the arms limitation process, thereby preparing the realization of more radical and far-reaching measures.

In the world politics of our day there is hardly a sphere where the need for the vigorous efforts of the United Nations and the states incorporated therein is perceived more acutely than arms limitation and disarmament and removal of the military threat. It is in the common interests of the states and peoples of the world to promote a further enhancement of the role and effectiveness of the United Nations as the instrument for realization of the lofty goal proclaimed in its charter--"delivering future generations from the disasters of war"--on the basis of the priority measures determined in its decisions designed to halt and turn back the arms race and lend the necessary impetus to efforts to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international supervision.

The need for this was recalled with new force by the commemoration by people of good will throughout the world in accordance with a UN General Assembly appeal of the 40th anniversary of the victory over German fascism and Japanese militarism in WWII. The sacred obligation of the governments of all states to the millions of those who fell for freedom and progress and to present and future generations is to uphold man's right to life and secure lasting peace--a world without weapons and wars. This applies in full to the United Nations also, which was created as a result of the victory over the forces of evil to serve as a center for the coordination of states' actions in the business of maintaining peace and international security.

A most important lesson of history was taken into consideration upon definition of the United Nations' high purpose, namely, states and peoples need to struggle against militarism and aggression resolutely and together, not waiting until the flame of war flares up. This lesson is more topical today than ever. For as a consequence of the qualitative change in the means of warfare modern weapons threaten mankind's very existence.

The mobilization of UN efforts in the sphere of disarmament is all the more necessary in that, ignoring the realities of the nuclear-space age, the United States, with the support of certain other Western states, is heading in the direction of the creation of assault space arms and continuing to gamble on the improvement and stockpiling of nuclear arms and first use thereof. Taking the arms race to space would make it qualitatively more dangerous and impart to it truly cosmic dimensions in all directions, in the nuclear direction primarily.

The new stage of the arms race in which the world is being involved today differs fundamentally from the preceding stages, and in an extraordinarily dangerous direction, furthermore.

Primarily a further arms buildup based on the latest discoveries and modern technology, including weapons systems for delivering strikes in space and from space, will lead unswervingly toward a raising of the levels of military confrontation and destabilization of the world atmosphere as far as the emergence of extremely explosive situations.

Further, the transatlantic instigators of the race are putting the main emphasis on the creation and deployment of the latest first-strike nuclear weapons systems, the use of which creates an entirely different situation in the decision-making process. Whereas in the comparatively recent past state leaders had more or less sufficient time in a situation fraught with the risk of a nuclear clash, it could now be a question literally of minutes determining the fate of whole countries and peoples. Furthermore, there is the likelihood of technical malfunctions or other chance circumstances, which could lead to the unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons.

III

Removal of the threat of nuclear war is now in the full meaning of the word global task No 1, on which not only the solution of other general problems but also the very existence of life on Earth depends. It is natural, therefore, that having proclaimed as its highest goal the deliverance of mankind from the disasters of war, the United Nations is called on to be the main forum where ways of preventing it are examined. And this is undoubtedly the arterial direction in the activity of the United Nations.

As the United States prepares to create assault space arms, paramount significance in the overall complex of questions of preventing nuclear war has been attached to the problem of preventing the militarization of space. Soviet proposals put forward at General Assembly session have been the basis for study thereof: the draft treaty banning the deployment in space of weapons of any kind (1981); the draft treaty banning the use of force in space and from space in respect of the Earth (1983); and the draft resolution on the use of space solely for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind (1984).

The profoundest concern for the fate of the present and future generations imbues the proposal submitted by the USSR for examination by the UN General Assembly 40th Session--"International Cooperation in the Peaceful Conquest of Space Under the Conditions of its Nonmilitarization".

All these initiatives were an important stimulus for the General Assembly, which has recommended repeatedly that the Geneva Disarmament Conference embark on negotiations for the purpose of drawing up an agreement preventing an arms race in space.

A special committee was created at the Disarmament Conference in 1985 which was instructed "to determine by means of general examination essentially the questions related to the prevention of an arms race in space".* This wording was the result of a compromise, to which the United States was forced to consent under the influence of other countries, including its allies. The special committee prepared the corresponding report. The task now is to ensure that the Disarmament Conference embark on the negotiations proper on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in space in all its aspects, as recommended by the General Assembly. Only the guaranteed prevention of the militarization of space will ensure the possibility of its conquest for the purpose of creation and not destruction and will open the way to the unification of all states' efforts in its peaceful use.

* Disarmament Conference Document CD/584, 29 March 1985.

An important measure for preventing a worldwide catastrophe would be all the nuclear powers' renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, as has already been done by the Soviet Union and the PRC. Similar commitments could be assumed unilaterally by each state possessing nuclear weapons which has not yet done so. Such a path, which does not require special negotiations and agreements, would make it possible to radically lower the level of the nuclear danger. At the same time the nuclear powers' commitments on no first use of nuclear weapons could also be enshrined in a single document of an international-law nature, which would in practice be tantamount to the complete legal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Despite the urgent appeal of the General Assembly, the United States, Britain and France are still refusing to assume a commitment in one form or another on no first use of nuclear weapons.

Yet such a commitment would mean a concretization with reference to the conditions of the nuclear-space age of the principle concerning the nonuse of force contained in the UN Charter. This could also be done at a global level by way of the conclusion of a world treaty on the nonuse of force in international relations, a draft of which was put forward by the Soviet Union in the UN General Assembly in 1976.*

A quantitative and qualitative freeze of nuclear arms, given appropriate supervision, could be an effective measure and at the same time one that is comparatively easy to implement. In the summer of 1983 the Soviet Union proposed to the United States, Britain, France and China a quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms freeze. Unfortunately, they did not accept the Soviet proposal. In the fall of the same year the UN General Assembly 38th Session appealed on the USSR's initiative to all the nuclear states to consent to a freeze, given appropriate supervision, of all their existing nuclear arms quantitatively and qualitatively, namely, to halt the buildup of all components of nuclear arsenals, including all types of nuclear weapon delivery systems and all types of nuclear warheads; not to develop new forms and types of nuclear arms; to establish a moratorium on all tests of nuclear warheads and tests of new types and kinds of their delivery systems; and to halt the production of fissionable materials for purposes of creating nuclear warheads.

In the same resolution the General Assembly called on the USSR and the United States--the states possessing the biggest nuclear arsenals--primarily and simultaneously to freeze their nuclear arms on a bilateral basis by way of example to the other nuclear states, which, in turn, were to have frozen their own nuclear arms as quickly as possible. The 39th session confirmed this appeal, emphasizing the need for a freeze by all nuclear states of their nuclear arms on a global scale, starting as of a certain date and given appropriate supervision. A further two resolutions on a freeze moving in the same direction were adopted on the initiative on the nonaligned states.**

* The socialist countries also put forward proposals on the conclusion of treaties specifying the principle of the nonuse of force between the Warsaw Pact states and NATO members and also between the participants in the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe.

** A resolution was approved on India's initiative proposing that a freeze be implemented by all five nuclear states. A resolution passed on the initiative of Mexico and Sweden called for a bilateral freeze--for the USSR and the United States. Supporting these proposals, the USSR combined in its resolution the two ideas--for both a bilateral and five-party freeze.

The mere fact of a whole number of states' presentation of various proposals on this issue testifies to the ripe, urgent nature of such a measure from the viewpoint of a halt to the nuclear arms race and a consolidation of strategic stability. As a result there would be a considerable lessening of the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict, the degree of trust between nuclear states would rise and there would be a turn toward an improvement in the overall atmosphere in the world. However, realization of the idea of a nuclear freeze is being blocked by the United States and a number of other states.

The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general banning of nuclear weapons tests and, prior to this, the declaration by all states possessing such weapons of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions would contribute to the suspension of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the creation of new models and types thereof. As is known, this question has been examined for a whole number of years by the UN General Assembly and the Disarmament Conference as one of the most paramount issues.

Every year the General Assembly adopts recommendations that the Disarmament Conference begin multilateral negotiations for the purpose of drawing up and concluding a treaty on the complete and general banning of nuclear weapons tests. However, this question also is being blocked by the United States. The reply of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a congressional committee inquiry leaves no doubt as to the reasons for such a position. Nuclear tests, the reply said, "are essential for the development and modernization of warheads, maintaining the reliability of stockpiles and evaluating the effect of the use of nuclear arms."*

At the same time in the United Nations and at the Geneva Disarmament Conference the representatives of the United States are attempting to camouflage their position by references to the difficulties of monitoring compliance with a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons.

The "Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Banning of Nuclear Weapons Tests," which was submitted by the Soviet Union at the General Assembly 37th Session, represent a sound basis for the achievement of agreement on this question. The document takes into consideration the degree of agreement reached in the course of the entire preceding discussion of the problem.

Increasingly great urgency is attached to the task of strengthening the conditions of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, primarily in connection with the nuclear ambitions of Israel and South Africa and also the growing danger of the appearance of nuclear weapons in certain other states also, particularly Pakistan. The spread of nuclear weapons and their appearance in areas of higher-than-usual military danger would undoubtedly seriously harm not only regional but also international security. This is why the question of the creation in various parts of the world of zones free of nuclear weapons is very acute. Progress along the path of realization of the proposals which exist on this score and the preparation of other measures to strengthen nonproliferation are an important direction of the struggle to prevent nuclear war.

* WASHINGTON POST, 10 September 1983.

Decisive progress on the path toward the goal set by the United Nations--achieving security through disarmament--cannot be secured by the efforts of just one side. It was for this reason that the UN General Assembly First Special Disarmament Session (1978) emphasized that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of the negotiations. Its final document observed that all states are obliged to promote such negotiations and determined the basic principles and directions and also the mechanism thereof. The United Nations has a right to demand that all states without exception abide in practice by the moral-political commitments assumed in accordance with the final document.

This is all the more necessary in that the process of the arms limitation and reduction negotiations has in recent years proven to be disorganized. Through the fault of the United States series of some negotiations have been disrupted, the start of others on most important aspects of a winding down of the arms race blocked. The situation, on the other hand, at the negotiations which are being conducted is being complicated by the fact that the United States is ignoring the principle of equality and equal security and endeavoring to obtain one-sided military advantages. Under current conditions the United Nations is called on to act energetically and assertively with respect to all the major problems of arms limitation and disarmament and to seek the resumption of the negotiations which have been suspended and the start of new ones. At the same time it is obvious that negotiations are not an end in themselves. It is essential that they lead to effective measures aimed at curbing the race in arms and their radical reduction. For this they must be conducted on a just and equal basis, without attempts by the participants to achieve one-sided military advantages. And in this respect the United Nations can have an impressive say.

Elementary logic suggests that before turning back the arms race it is first necessary to halt it. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union proposed the imposition of a moratorium on the creation, including scientific research, of assault space arms and also a freeze on nuclear arms. By way of good will gestures it assumed important unilateral commitments: the undertaking on the nonuse of nuclear weapons (1982); the undertaking not to be the first to put antisatellite weapons in space (1983); the unilateral moratorium (as of 7 April 1985) on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles and the implementation of other retaliatory measures in Europe adopted as a consequence of the deployment of the new American missiles; and the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions (as of 6 August 1985).

However, the United States not only failed to respond positively to the unilateral steps of the Soviet Union but embarked on a number of actions of a directly opposite nature.

Many UN member-states are expressing dissatisfaction at the state of affairs in issues of a reduction in arms (primarily nuclear) and disarmament. There is every reason for this. The question of the need for an enhancement of the United Nations' role in this sphere has been raised repeatedly and continues to be raised. A special committee was set up in 1976 even to study the UN

role in the disarmament sphere. Subsequently this question was examined by the General Assembly. Its 39th session proposed in a special resolution that all states communicate their thoughts and proposals on the ways and means with the aid of which the United Nations might perform its central role more effectively and bear the main responsibility in the disarmament sphere.*

At the same time, however, it would seem that the United Nations has by no means as yet exhausted its potential for prompting all states, nuclear primarily, to act in the direction of a curbing of the arms race by the method of mutual example.

A tendency is being displayed on the part of a number of countries to seek the causes of the unsatisfactory state of affairs concerning the solution of questions of disarmament and ways of enhancing the UN role in this sphere in shortcomings of the existing mechanism for examining these problems. The opponents of disarmament are playing on this. In striving for a so-called "rationalization of procedures" they are essentially attempting to cut short UN activity in the said sphere, in other words, to reduce to a minimum discussion of the most important problems and by way of procedural manipulations to preclude the adoption of decisions which do not suit them.

In actual fact the true causes of the insufficient progress in the disarmament sphere are to be found not in the mechanism or procedures of the negotiations but in the reluctance of a number of important states to put an end to the arms race. Under these conditions concentration of the United Nations' attention on procedural-organizational issues concerning disarmament could only divert attention from the real essence of the problems and lead to a break with forms of negotiations which have justified themselves, which would enable the opponents of disarmament to continue to shun participation in the negotiations and the assumption of commitments in this sphere. Damage would thereby be done to states' efforts in the business of halting the arms race and of disarmament which are being made both within the UN framework and outside.

IV

The Soviet Union invariably supports a stimulation of the United Nations' contribution to the accomplishment of the long-urgent task of a halt to the arms race, which is dangerous for peace, and a transition to a reduction in arms stockpiles and disarmament. But what paths lead to this goal?

It is first of all necessary to strive for implementation of the UN decisions which are filled with responsibility for the fate of peace--on preventing the militarization of space and on its peaceful use, the declaration on the condemnation and prevention of nuclear war, the resolutions in support of the renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, a halt to the buildup of arsenals thereof, the banning of all tests thereof and so forth. The United Nations can and must continue efforts to create a moral-political atmosphere which would make it possible, finally, to embark on practicable measures of

* UN General Assembly Resolution 39/151, 17 December 1984.

arms limitation and disarmament. Maximum use should be made for this of the organization's entire moral-political authority and the credit of respect and trust which it has rightly acquired thanks to actions corresponding to the lofty goals and principles of its charter. The UN decisions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament are perceptibly complicating the actions of militarist circles and at the same time encouraging the efforts of the supporters of arms limitation and reduction and strengthening the positions of realistic politicians and peace-loving forces. Governments which are obliged to heed the will and interests of their peoples cannot ignore them.

The UN General Assembly Third Special Disarmament Session planned for 1986 is called on to impart appreciable new impetus to the efforts in the sphere of curbing and turning back the arms race. But careful preparatory work is essential for it to be able to adopt effective decisions aimed at preventing nuclear war, limiting the arms race and at disarmament.

The adoption of an all-embracing disarmament program, whose elaboration has been under way for a number of years now, would undoubtedly contribute to an enhancement of the efficiency of the United Nations.

The World Disarmament Campaign, which provides for the United Nations' closer interaction with public organizations and movements and promotes their active involvement in the struggle to curb militarist forces and the extensive dissemination of truthful information about the consequences of a continuation of the arms race, has been conducted since 1982 on the initiative of the United Nations.

The potential of the United Nations in this respect is far from exhausted. The effect of UN efforts within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign will be even more perceptible if they are oriented toward the development of close interaction with the most representative mass movements and organizations. The more extensive illustration in the material disseminated by the UN Secretariat of UN decisions on key questions of removal of the nuclear threat and disarmament would be very useful also.

The celebration of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations and the proclamation of 1986 as International Peace Year will serve as additional stimulus to the mobilization of the efforts of peoples and states to consolidate international peace and security. The successful implementation of measures within this framework will contribute to an intensification of states' joint actions in the business of removing the military threat and ensuring security by way of disarmament.

Of course, the task of increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations is not confined to measures in the sphere of preventing nuclear war and arms limitation. The question of whether the United Nations' role in efforts to maintain peace and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts is sufficiently effective is pertinent here. The results of its work do not as yet provide grounds for a simple evaluation.

In a whole number of instances, mainly when the disputes and conflicts have not been of an explosive nature, the United Nations has been able to perform a certain positive role. However, when the development of a dispute has gone beyond the peaceful stage and approached the start of armed operations, the organization has proven incapable of preventing or stopping them.

In this connection critics of the United Nations frequently assert that the collective security system envisaged by its charter is "unrealistic," "imperfect" and so forth. Attempts are thus made to underpin the demands for a revision of the UN Charter and, primarily, cancellation of the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.

In actual fact--and precisely given a realistic view of the state of affairs--the UN Charter and the principles of a collective security system contained therein provide the maximum of what may be done under the difficult conditions of the modern world. The key principle--the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council--has served and continues to serve as a reliable barrier against this body being used for purposes which run counter to the interests of maintaining international peace and security.

As experience shows, the principle of unanimity in the Security Council is also of great significance for the young developing states and small countries and the peoples struggling for freedom and independence. Thus J. Castaneda, the well-known Mexican specialist in the field of international law and diplomacy, observed in one of his studies that "abrogation of the right of veto in instances of a serious threat to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression would not be to the benefit of small or medium-sized states. The veto serves as a barrier preventing small countries, often against their will, being dragged into ventures which basically serve the interests of the leading powers. Paradoxically, the veto serves to protect small countries more than the great ones."*

The Soviet Union has repeatedly used its rights and powers as a permanent member of the Security Council to support national liberation movements and defend the just cause of peoples struggling against colonial and racist domination. All states, regardless of their size, military power, economic development or allegiance to this social system or the other, have an interest in preservation of the permanence of the principle of unanimity. The very existence of the United Nations is inconceivable without this principle: it would then be some other organization.

No, the reasons why some of its useful decisions remain on paper, centers of military danger are preserved in certain parts of the world and the shameful sores of colonial-racist domination have not yet finally been done away with are not to be found in the UN Charter. On the contrary, all these are consequences of the fact that some UN member states are failing to comply with the charter's provisions and acting in breach of the noble principles and goals proclaimed therein.

* Quoted from "The Soviet Union at International Conferences of the 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War Period," vol V, "UN Conference in San Francisco (25 April-26 June 1945)," Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1980, p 29.

Even the best and most accomplished charter is not in itself a guarantee that its provisions will be implemented and ensure the preservation of peace. Besides the existence of a good charter, the unity and cohesive action of the participants in the world community are further needed for the accomplishment of this task.

The organization's charter contains many unused possibilities and reserves. The ways and means of an increase in the effectiveness of the United Nations and a strengthening of its authority should be sought precisely on the basis of its strict and consistent observance.

The report on the CPSU Central Committee Politburo session issued on 23 August 1985 emphasized that the Soviet Union "attaches great significance to the United Nations as an effective instrument of peace." It went on to say: "The USSR will continue to strive to ensure that the just democratic principles on which the United Nations was founded 40 years ago be embodied in the practice of international relations. Proceeding from the main statutory task of the United Nations--the preservation and consolidation of peace--the Soviet Union will at the upcoming General Assembly session also exert efforts to ensure that the main place in its work be occupied by questions of a halt to the arms race. Simultaneously the USSR will, as before, support the development on an equal basis of international cooperation in various spheres, in the peaceful conquest of space under the conditions of its nonmilitarization included."

It is such a line which will lead to the increased effectiveness of the United Nations and the full disclosure of its potential as an effective instrument of peace.

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CSO: 1816/03

SMALL WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN WORLD POLITICS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 36-41

[Article by L. Voronkov: "Small Western European Countries in World Politics"]

[Text] Official representatives, public and political figures, scientists-specialists, and journalists of small Western European countries in their public statements and discussion, often cite the fact that their states lack all practical possibilities to influence the state of world affairs. This motive is used to justify the self withdrawal of some of them from active participation in solving currently important international problems and their refusal to take any independent and constructive foreign policy initiatives.

However, a realistic analysis of the contemporary international situation and of its development trends promises no grounds for these claims. As a result of qualitative changes in international relations in connection with the rise and development of the world socialist system and the strengthening of its international positions and the appearance of dozens of young liberated states on the fragments of colonial empires, it has become possible for all states striving for peace, regardless of their power or size, to follow their independent foreign policy course. The CPSU and Soviet Government leaders and many prominent figures of a whole number of other countries have pointed out more than once the growing opportunities for small states to play a constructive role in contemporary world politics.

And what is involved in this connection is by no means any artificial opposition of the small capitalist states to the bigger ones. The general laws of capitalism are fully in effect both in the large and the small and medium-sized capitalist countries. However, the intensity of their manifestation may be different in the individual spheres, a fact that, of course, affects the foreign policy practice of the governments of small Western European states.

I

The claims regarding the relative economic and political helplessness of small countries undoubtedly had a solid ground in the past, that is, in the period when capitalism exercised complete sway in the world and when the substance of

International relations basically amounted to a continuous confrontation between the biggest powers over the question of "how the weaker nations conquered by them should be divided between the powerful and rich nations."*

The struggle between the biggest capitalist powers for divisions and redivisions of the world and for markets, sources of raw materials, and spheres of capital investment turned mainly into territorial conquests. This ensured the physical ownership, direct control and forcible domination of foreign territories that represented the main objects of imperialist expansions as well as of interimperialist contradictions.

This kind of threat also hung constantly over the small European states. Lacking the possibility of relying on military force as an instrument of their foreign policy in relation to the biggest imperialist powers, they were forced to continue to adapt themselves to the then existing system of international relations in which the approach based on military force was predominant. In the final analysis the political calculations and economic interests of big powers also predetermined the fate of war and peace for small peoples and states and even the possibility for their independent existence. Any attempts by them to resolve the problems of their security on the basis of joining the blocks with the biggest imperialist powers led to the opposite results because these attempts inevitably involved them in European conflicts and wars.

The vulnerability of the international position of small countries gave rise to the aspiration--which has become traditional--to keep away from active participation in international life and to limit themselves only to providing from time to time mediating services in overcoming the contradictions between big powers and solving the conflicts between them.

The policy of neutrality turned out to be especially attractive to small countries. It made it possible for them to maintain advantageous economic relations with big powers and, at the same time, to avoid any participation in confrontations between the latter and thereby also the risk of turning their territories into an arena of military conflicts.

Mankind's entry into the historical era of transition from capitalism to socialism initiated the dynamic process of qualitative changes in all spheres of social life, the changes taking place under the growing influence of world socialism. Imperialism has lost its decisive role in world politics. At the same time, the sphere of operation of the new type of relations between peoples, engendered by socialism, is steadily widening. These changes are directly reflected in the position of states, including, of course, the small ones, both within the system of capitalism and in the international arena as a whole.

Despite the fact that after the victory of the Great October Revolution the imperialist bourgeoisie tried to include the small European countries in various anti-Soviet combinations, it failed in the final analysis to draw them into active participation in the military intervention against revolutionary Russia.

* V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works", vol 35, p 14.

"...The attempt by big powers to mobilize against us the small countries--which are all absolutely and implicitly under their influence--has utterly failed because of contradictions between the interests of international imperialism and the interests of these small countries."* Analyzing this fact, V.I. Lenin pointed out that not only the workers and peasants but also a part of the bourgeoisie of small countries in the end did not move against us. "...When the straightforward question was either going with the Entente and helping it to suppress the Bolsheviks or helping the Bolsheviks by means of staying neutral, it turned out that we won this suit and obtained neutrality."** The small European countries played a certain role in enabling Soviet Russia to overcome diplomatic isolation and economic blockade which the biggest Western powers tried to organize.

The loss by imperialism of its dominant role in international relations and the ever growing influence of the foreign policy of countries of the socialist community on the course of world events have created real prerequisites for the democratic principles of interstate relations to become predominant in world politics. The realization of the foreign policy ideals of the new system is connected with providing an opportunity for every sovereign state to follow its own independent foreign policy course, while the strategy of imperialism is based on subordinating the policies of individual independent states to the interests of the struggle against socialism and other currents of the world revolutionary process.

As far as the USSR is concerned, the relations with the small Western European countries have always played and continue to play an important role. Steadfastly following the principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union strives to assert a new type of international relations with these countries, relations based on equality and mutually beneficial economic, political, and cultural cooperation and on the exclusion of the methods of military force, used by imperialism, from the practice of international relations. The consistent actions of the USSR and other socialist states in support of the principles of peaceful coexistence and the ensuring of this course with the entire might and authority of the socialist community substantially widen the objective possibilities for the small Western European countries to follow a truly independent policy.

The USSR's relations with Finland, Austria and several other small European countries play a constructive role in asserting positive changes in the European and world arenas. These relations have convincingly demonstrated in practice the possibility and fruitfulness of stable forms of mutually beneficial peaceful cooperation based on equality. The small Western European countries are able in this sphere to exercise a positive influence on the development of a structure of peaceful relations between East and West. The widening of this cooperation not only does not constitute a threat to them but, on the contrary, also furthers the strengthening of general security that represents the most reliable basis for safeguarding the national interests of states.

* V.I. Lenin, "Complete Collected Works", vol 39, p 349.

** Ibid., pp 395-396.

The small Western European countries that show a desire to develop good-neighborly relations with the socialist states invariably find the latter to be sincere and equal partners. In the sphere of East-West relations the small Western European countries have considerable possibilities at their disposal to be an active and independent factor in world politics.

II

In the conditions of the new correlation of forces in the world arena, objective prerequisites have developed for small countries to follow an autonomous foreign policy course, a course that is more independent from the leading imperialist powers, and to participate more actively in international life. All this widens the possibilities for increasing their contribution to solving the currently important international problems.

Striving to consolidate the forces of capitalism under the conditions of existence of the world socialist system, the leading imperialist powers have been forced to change their tune in their relations with their "small partners." What is involved here is the fact that the very possibility for implementing the global strategy of imperialism depends to a considerable extent on whether the main imperialist powers succeed in enlisting the small Western European countries in its implementation.

Despite the fact that the proportional share of the individual states of this group in the industrial production of the capitalist world is small (amounting to no more than 1.5 to 2 percent), it is comparable in its total aggregate to the indexes of the third industrial power of capitalism, the FRG, and the rates of growth of gross domestic produce in the small Western European countries are on the whole higher than the respective rates in the big states. As a result of this, their proportional share in the industrial production of Western Europe increased from 24 percent in 1960 to 28 percent in 1984 and in foreign trade from 36.7 percent in 1960 to 39.5 percent of the total value of West European exports in 1984.*

The positions of small countries are especially impressive in such industrial branches as the machine building, machine tool making, shipbuilding, electrical engineering, chemical, cellulose and paper, and several other industries. Many of them are large producers of food products (meat and dairy products, fish and fish products) and mineral fertilizers and have developed food flavoring industries and agricultural machine building.

The economy of Western European countries is oriented to a considerable extent to foreign markets and is characterized by a high degree of economic specialization. For instance, Greece and Norway have an established reputation of international maritime shippers; the Netherlands' port of Rotterdam and the Belgian port of Antwerp rank among the world's biggest ports; the role of Swiss banks is universally known; many small Western European countries have turned into large international tourist centers.

The important and often monopolist positions of small countries in the production of and trade in industrial and agricultural products and certain

* Calculations according to the "Economic Situation of Capitalist and Developing Countries, Survey for 1984 and the Beginning of 1985." Supplement to MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEXHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 8, 1985, pp 9, 92.

types of raw materials, and in providing certain types of international services are transforming these countries into an essential component part of the world economy and the entire system of international economic relations. If the small countries were to "fall out" of the system of international economic relations, this would have an extraordinarily painful effect on the economy of many countries, including the biggest capitalist powers.

Under the conditions of the scientific-technological revolution, the laws of specialization, dictated by domestic needs of the development of production forces, receive additional stimuli that make a tangible imprint on the economic life of small Western European countries and their participation in the international division of labor and the entire world economic relations. Their economic specialization engenders the need for their active foreign economic relations on as broad a basis as possible, including, of course, economic relations with the socialist states.

However, the leading imperialist powers are making considerable efforts to draw the small Western European countries into participation in the implementation of their global antisocialist strategy and to force them to embark on the path of curtailing their economic relations and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist states, something that is contrary to the requirements and needs of the small countries themselves. Recently many of them, including Austria, Greece, Finland, and Sweden, have been subjected to overt economic and political pressures from the United States, which wants to force them to adjust their relations with the countries of socialism in a spirit that is suitable to Washington. However, in the conditions in which the socialist system exists and is successfully developing, the United States and some other large capitalist countries are no longer able to ensure the attainment of desired goals by force or exclusively by means of methods of pressure, imposition of their will on junior partners, and gross political diktats. Actively using the coincidence of class interests as well as multifaceted methods of economic, military-political and ideological pressure, the leading imperialist powers at the same time are compelled to take account of certain concrete interests of their allies in order to keep them within the sphere of their influence.

As a result of the broadening of opportunities of the small Western European states to play an active role in international relations, their responsibility for the state of world affairs, too, has increased. There is an increasingly urgent need for coordinating the actions in the international arena with the interests of detente and of improving the political climate and for taking the corresponding constructive initiatives.

At the same time it is impossible not to notice that the utilization of their increased possibilities by the small countries does not always turn into actions that take account of the interests of the entire world community. The position of some of them on solving the questions of division of fishing zones and continental shelves can be cited as an example in this connection. Some individual countries show an inclination to use in their foreign policy the logic of confrontation between the two systems in the international arena for the purpose of solving some or other questions to their own advantage, and in this connection they do not always consider the interests of other states.

The fundamental changes that have taken place in the entire system of contemporary international relations have led to a deepening interdependence between ensuring the national security of the small Western European states and strengthening European and general security.

The small Western European countries could help consolidate international security with practical steps aimed at improving the political climate in the world, at promoting detente, peaceful international cooperation, disarmament and at solving contemporary global problems.

An indication of the essentially increased opportunities of the small Western European countries in this respect is provided, for instance, by the foreign policy steps taken by Greece. As is known, A. Papandreou's government has come forth in support of forming a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans and it has requested the liquidation of the American military bases on Greek territory and refused to follow the policy of economic sanctions against the countries of socialism, imposed by the R. Reagan administration on the NATO allies, and to support the deployment of the new American medium-range missiles in Europe.

Sweden's social democratic government headed by O. Palme has expressed its support for the idea of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and declared its readiness to start negotiations on forming such a zone. It has made a proposal to set up a zone free from "battleground" nuclear weapons in central Europe.

Referring to the "Palme commission's" proposal to form a "nuclear-free corridor" along the meeting line between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, M.S. Gorbachev has characterized it as being "in tune" with Soviet policy and declared himself in favor of implementing it.*

The role played by Finland in the preparations for and successful conclusion of the all-European conference and the choice of Helsinki as the place where the historic Final Act was signed and where the preparatory consultations for the Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe were also held attests to a widening of the framework of that country's foreign political activities and to the great international authority of its peace-loving foreign policy.

Finland's proposal to form a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe has attracted the attention of the world public. The realization of this initiative would represent an essential contribution to the efforts to strengthen the climate of good-neighborliness and confidence on the entire continent; it would not only correspond to the national interests of Finland but also to those of other northern European countries, and would further the easing of tension on the entire continent.

* PRAVDA, 11 October 1985.

Austria is actively engaged in the efforts to continue the all-European process initiated in Helsinki. It supports the idea of development of cooperation between East and West in the sphere of energy, environmental protection, and transportation (in particular, in the sphere of European shipping) and advocates the conclusion of an agreement on banning especially dangerous types of weapons and the achievement of success at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe.

The foreign policy efforts of these countries are aimed at strengthening the system of security and cooperation in Europe, lowering the level of military confrontation on the continent and consequently, ensuring the most reliable solutions for the national security problems of the states situated in this region.

The increased authority of the small Western European countries is a direct consequence of the policy of relaxation of tension. Turning the principles of interstate relations, approved by the CSCE, into the norm of contemporary international relations can create the conditions for a further growth of the importance of these states in world politics.

The role played by the group of European neutral and nonaligned countries in the efforts aimed at continuing the Helsinki process and achieving mutually acceptable accords at the meetings and conferences held within its framework is widely known. In this connection it is possible to call attention to the positive role played by this group in the successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting that adopted the decision on convening the Stockholm Conference on Confidence Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe.

Heated discussions about the main directions of security policy under the changed historical conditions are now in progress in many small Western European countries. At the center of these debates is the problem of choosing between safeguarding national security and independence by strengthening defense efforts and increasing the might of the armed forces, on the one hand, and an active foreign policy engagement aimed at strengthening international security and detente and improving the political atmosphere in the world, on the other.

It is important to emphasize in this connection that as a rule the choice in favor of increasing defense efforts does not lead to strengthening the security of these countries or to improving the world political climate or to strengthening the independence of these countries. Moreover, by making such a choice, the small Western European countries inevitably enter into military cooperation with the main imperialist powers and fall into a state of rigid military-political dependence on them, a dependence that negatively affects their ability to take independent foreign policy actions and which can draw them into a strategy that is dangerous for the cause of peace.

The history of the formation of the postwar doctrines of national security in the small Western European countries and the existence of differences between them in this sphere attest to the fact that the correlation of forces within this or that country which developed under the impact of events in the international arena and the degree of influence of democratic circles on the process of decisionmaking on foreign policy affairs have always been of decisive

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importance for the elaboration of these doctrines. The nature of the foreign policy steps taken by the governments of the small Western European countries depends in many respects on the question of whose benefit the correlation of their internal political forces moves in relation to the topical problems of world politics.

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CSO: 1816/03

U.S. BINARY WEAPONS PLANS ASSAILED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 67-71

[Article by V. Ustinov: "New Step Toward the Creation of Binary Weapons"]

[Text]

I

Preparations are under way across the Atlantic for the realization of new plans aimed at a spiraling of the arms race. The final vote in the U.S. Congress on the appropriation of resources for the production of a new variety of chemical weapons--nerve-paralyzing binary warheads--is scheduled. In the event of approval of this project, which was prepared by a conciliation committee of the two chambers, the Pentagon hopes in the 1986 fiscal year even to obtain \$155 million for "chemical reinforcement and rearmament," that is, the replacement of chemical arsenals.

According to American press reports, without waiting for the official adoption of a decision on the allocation of appropriations, the U.S. Defense Department has embarked on the allocation of contracts for the production of these weapons for a sum total of almost \$1.5 billion.

The policy of developing binary chemical warheads based on the use of several relatively less toxic substances which when combined form a lethal poisonous substance was adopted in the United States back in 1949. According to data of the Stockholm Institute for the Study of Peace and Disarmament (SIPRI), in 1965 the navy patented the design of a binary chemical bomb and in February 1969 acquired appropriations for a research contract for binary-type cluster chemical warheads filled with the components of a sarin (GB)-type war gas. These warheads were intended for use against ground targets from launchers mounted on supersonic aircraft. On the basis of a study of such data the SIPRI concluded in 1973 even that the U.S. Army was examining several other "binary" warhead designs.* In recent years binary warheads developed within the framework of the broad-based 5-year "chemical rearmament" program proclaimed in 1982. It is planned spending on its realization \$10 billion all told in order to fundamentally modernize the military-chemical arsenal and

* See "The Problems of Chemical and Biological Warfare," SIPRI, vol 11 ("Chemical and Biological Weapons Today"), Stockholm, 1973.

The administration's concentrated pressure on the legislators has increased continuously. As of February C. Weinberger and other high-ranking military officers have been insisting on the incorporation in the budget of special appropriations for the production of new chemical weapons. A chemical weapons commission was set up in March under the auspices of the President made up of such fierce champions of the arms race as Z. Brzezinski, A. Haig and others. The commission reached the conclusion concerning the need to modernize the United States' chemical arsenals by way of the organization of the line production of qualitatively new binary weapons. Although from the viewpoint of its composition the commission did not inspire particular trust inasmuch as it did not include convinced critics of this program, its report in support of the production of new chemical arms was studied by many congressmen. In addition, several influential members of the commission joined personally in the lobbying campaign.

Long before the vote in the House emissaries of the Pentagon enveloped 133 members of Congress in special briefings, stressing the "interests of security and arms control". Together with the opponents of the program they worked persistently on congressmen who earlier had displayed hesitation on this issue. As a result 28 of the 30 newly elected Republicans who took part in the voting ultimately supported the military's viewpoint. Special maneuvers were organized for the opponents of binary weapons to demonstrate the need for such weapons. Nor were the members of Congress and also their staffers of whom it was known that they were skeptical toward the "threat on the part of the Russians" myth left unattended. For them the Pentagon organized information sessions with the participation of intelligence representatives. According to G. Isaacs, director of the Council for a Viable World organization, "wherever the opponents of the production of war gas appeared, Pentagon lobbyists had gotten there first."*

The danger of the White House's course toward the expansion and qualitative renewal of the chemical weapons arsenal is intensified by the fact that the United States already possesses the world's biggest stockpiles of such weapons, which, according to experts' estimates, could destroy all mankind many times over. It is well known, for example, that the annual production of the plant producing sarin in Newport (Indiana) is sufficient to create lethal concentrations of this war gas over a considerable part of Europe. The American arsenal which already exists runs to 55,000 tons of highly toxic nerve gas and 150,000 tons of chemical warheads. The United States has more than 10 large-scale chemical arms stores on its territory and overseas, including West Europe. Some 4 million liters of highly toxic sarin and VX-type war gas are stored in U.S. Army dumps in the FRG alone.**

In addition, the United States is accelerating the construction of a large repository for chemical weapons on the Pacific atoll of Johnston (1,100 kilometers from the Hawaiian Islands) intended for 13,000 tons of chemical bombs, whose toxicity is so great that their importation into the United

* NEW YORK TIMES, 15 August 1985.

** "Whence the Threat to Peace," pp 51-52.

states is categorically prohibited by American law. To judge by everything, the atoll is being assigned the role of backup chemical warfare center in the Pacific.

The Pentagon's attempts to drag its allies into its military-chemical preparations cannot be overlooked. It is planned deploying cruise missiles, aerial bombs and artillery shells fitted with the latest chemical charges primarily at American bases in Great Britain, the FRG and Italy and then in other West European countries. The Big Eye chemical aerial bombs will be deployed on board aircraft carriers in the East Atlantic and Mediterranean.*

The foreign press does not conceal the fact that the United States intends deploying binary weapons beyond its territory. A NEW YORK TIMES report which emphasized that "the allies' opinion will not be decisive" ** on the question of deployment of the new weapons testifies to this.

According to Western press reports, it is planned building on FRG territory a further five chemical weapons dumps, in Allgau and Schwarzwald included, for the storage of 19,000 tons of binary weapon war gas and also binary warheads for howitzers and the Big Eye aerial bombs. It is planned storing there in time warheads with a chemical filling for the Lance and cruise missiles.

According to a report of the British weekly NEW SCIENTIST, missiles with highly toxic nerve gas will be delivered to the American bases at Lakenheath and Upper Heyford in Britain, which already have F-111 bombers.

Also chosen together with Britain and the FRG as a location for the storing of binary war gas is Italy, where it is proposed concentrating weapons which could be used for an operation on NATO's southern flank and adjacent areas of Africa and the Near and Middle East. In addition, it is also planned deploying war gas stocks at U.S. bases in the Near and Middle East to support the combat operations of the RDF. As the American journal PROGRESSIVE pointed out, "the Europeans understand that when the United States speaks of a new war being fought, it does not refer to combat operations in the suburbs of Washington. The battlefield will be densely populated areas of Central Europe."

World press reports concerning West Europe's possible enlistment in the plans to deploy the latest U.S. chemical arms are also being confirmed by the pronouncements of American officials. Thus Gen B. Rogers, commander of NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe, declared plainly that binary chemical weapons together with nuclear weapons could be used from the very outset of military operations on the European continent. According to Lieutenant General Donnelly, commander of the U.S.A.F. in Europe, and General Otis, commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, it is contemplated deploying and using binary warheads primarily on the European continent.

* "Whence the Threat to Peace," p 52.

** NEW YORK TIMES, 26 June 1985.

Advocating the production of binary warheads, J. Wade, deputy assistant U.S. defense secretary, declared in Congress back in 1981 that the accelerated provision of the U.S. Army with the latest types of chemical weapon was essential to "have the possibility of fighting a large-scale chemical war in Europe against the Warsaw Pact countries." According to J. Kester, former Pentagon employee and a compiler of the Chemical Weapons Commission report, "it would be best were we to provide for the forward basing of some of these weapons." While House member Spratt bluntly calls on the West Europeans to assume some of the burden connected with the deployment of chemical weapons.*

II

In the light of the facts which have been adduced it should be no surprise that the anger of the world community at the American plans to use West Europe as a springboard for chemical warfare is growing and that the demands that Washington abandon the development, production and deployment of new types of chemical weapon are increasing.

A bill submitted in the U.S. House in March 1983 by congressmen from both parties banning the production of chemical warheads may serve as an indication of such dissatisfaction. Its purpose was to block the administration's intention to embark on the production of binary weapons--155-mm artillery shells and Big Eye aerial bombs.

In connection with the plans for the allocation of appropriations for the production of binary weapons senators E. Kennedy, G. Hart, W. Proxmire and others pointed out in March 1982 in a letter to J. Tower, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee: "We believe that the creation of these weapons will not strengthen the United States' national security and that there is no need for them from the defense viewpoint."

It is perfectly understandable that Washington's plans are causing particular disquiet in West Europe. The joint initiative of the SED and the SPD--the FRG's biggest opposition party--on the question of the creation in Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons, which was promulgated in June 1985, was a reflection of this disquiet. It is envisaged as a priority step that such a zone should encompass the territory of the GDR, FRG and CSSR. Noting the danger emanating from the chemical weapons which exist currently, both parties expressed concern in connection with the new military-technical developments in this sphere, which are a threat to mankind of a new scale and which make the achievement of agreement on disarmament considerably more difficult.

As Dutch Foreign Minister H. van den Broek declared, his government does not intend permitting the United States to deploy chemical weapons on Dutch territory. L. (Budtts), chairman of Denmark's Social Democratic Party Security and Foreign Policy Commission, advocated a ban on chemical weapons and supported the idea of the creation in Europe of a zone free of such weapons.

* NEW YORK TIMES, 12 August 1985.

The United States' intention to speed up the creation of binary warheads is increasing the danger of the spread of chemical weapons over the planet. The possibility of producing all the components of binary chemical weapons secretly, in the guise of conventional commercial chemicals, and also the relative simplicity and accessibility of their production are creating the prerequisites for the stockpiling of chemical arms by a wide range of states. The following estimation of the weekly NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE is indicative in this connection: "Pentagon representatives acknowledge that as soon as the production of binary warheads begins, the further proliferation of chemical weapons overseas will be inevitable." And, further: "The use of chemical weapons on the battlefield in Europe will probably lead to millions of casualties among the civilian population."

The negative consequences of the creation and deployment such weapons have been shown convincingly by prominent arms limitation experts. Thus G. Brauch, member of the SPD Board's Security Commission and fellow of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies, pointed out: "Under conditions where the early warning time is sharply reduced and the effect of a preventive attack is growing, neutron warheads and nerve gas combined with the latest, even more accurate tactical weapon delivery systems will increase instability in a crisis situation and increase the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction." It is his belief that adoption of the new generation of nerve gas is just one of a number of destabilizing factors engendered by the improvement of weapons systems. He refers here to the experience of multiple-warhead missiles, which serves as convincing confirmation of the proposition: "If new technology has been introduced and if billions have been spent thereon, it is very difficult to achieve a point where it is considered possible to renounce it."

It is difficult to square the intensive preparations for the creation of binary warheads with the U.S. Administration's declarations concerning its interest in the elaboration of an international convention banning chemical weapons. They are also contrary to UN General Assembly decisions condemning the creation of binary weapons, as, equally, the proliferation of chemical arms as a whole.

It is fitting to recall that as of 1981 the UN General Assembly has regularly passed resolutions expressing profound concern in connection with the planned production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. These resolutions invariably contain an appeal to all states "to refrain from any actions which could complicate the negotiations on banning chemical weapons and, in particular, refrain from the production and deployment of chemical weapons on the territory of other states."*

Against the background of the Pentagon's efforts to step up military-chemical preparations the attempts of official American propaganda to accuse the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries of "overtaking" NATO in this sphere appear unconvincing. Such assertions are refuted in the United States itself. Thus Congressman D. Bonior in the past rejected in the House the inventions to the effect that the program for a chemical arms buildup was merely a "response"

* UN Document. Resolution 39/65 B, 12, December 1985.

to similar work in the socialist countries, pointing to the lack of evidence and proof on this score. In the opinion of Sen G. Hart, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, there are no reliable data underpinning the assertion that the Soviet Union built up chemical weapons at an accelerated pace in the 1970's.

Washington's accusations leveled at another are aimed at concealing its own unseemly actions, including the suspension in 1980 through the fault of the United States of the Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and distracting attention from actual instances of the use of American chemical weapons in the not-too-distant past. Yet, as R. Schweiker, secretary for Health and Human Services of the United States, admitted, during the aggression in Southeast Asia American forces used chemical weapons in 41 operations, as a result of which more than 2 million Vietnamese suffered and vegetation over 43 percent of the area in use was destroyed.

III

The Soviet Union consistently advocates a complete ban on chemical weapons, including such barbaric varieties thereof as binary warheads. The TASS statement of 19 February 1982 issued in connection with Washington's proclamation of the program for "chemical rearmament," including plans for furnishing the U.S. Army with binary warheads, emphasized: "The United States does not conceal the fact that it is its intention that chemical warfare would be conducted in the densely populated parts of Europe and other continents. The plans being discussed in the United States to fit cruise missiles, aerial bombs and artillery shells with new chemical warheads, a large number of which it is planned deploying in the European countries as part of the American forward-based weapons, also serve this criminal goal." A statement disseminated as an official document of the Disarmament Conference drew attention to the pronouncements of Pentagon representatives that furnishing the U.S. Army with the latest war gases was designed to afford an opportunity for conducting large-scale chemical warfare in Europe.

The joint working document "Binary Weapons and the Problem of an Effective Ban on Chemical Weapons," which was submitted by a number of socialist countries in the Disarmament Committee (subsequently transformed into the Disarmament Conference) on 11 March 1982, emphasizes the disastrous consequences of the deployment of binary warheads, for solution of the problem of separating commercial chemicals from chemicals intended for use for chemical weapon purposes included. Particular attention is called here to the difficulties of monitoring compliance with a future convention banning chemical weapons. "Supervision itself--both national and, particularly, international," the document says, "will in many cases be extremely difficult, if it is possible at all, and conditions could emerge for the secret stockpiling and storage of chemicals for binary weapons and the creation of chemical weapons in the guise of commercial production."*

* Document CD/258 Corr. 1, 11 March 1982.

The Soviet draft "Basic Provisions Governing a Ban on the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction" has been available for examination in the Geneva Disarmament Conference since 1982. It takes account of the results of Soviet-American negotiations and also the viewpoints of other states. This proposal, which is drawn up in detail and profoundly considered, embraces the problem of a ban on chemical weapons in all its basic aspects. Measures of international control, including on-site verification of compliance with a future convention, and also the possibility of international inspections with the consent of the corresponding state are provided for.

The Soviet Union's position in connection with the intention of the U.S. Congress to allocate appropriations for the production of binary chemical weapons was set forth in the TASS statement of 11 July 1985, which was disseminated as an official document of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. It emphasizes that the United States has in practice approached the point of adding to its military arsenal a new, even more dangerous variety of barbaric weapon--a nerve-paralyzing lethal mixture--and the decisions leading to the production of binary weapons have been made precisely at a time when negotiations are continuing at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. In connection with the intention to deploy binary weapons primarily on the territory of the United States' West European allies the statement points out that, as in the case involving the missiles being deployed in a number of West European states, the insidiousness of the designs of Washington, which would like to remain aloof and is hoping to expose the territory of its allies to a retaliatory attack, is manifested anew here.

Extensive comment was elicited worldwide and primarily in Europe by the readiness expressed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in conversation with SPD Deputy Chairman Rau on 10 September 1985 in the event of the creation in Central Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons "to guarantee and respect the status of this zone," and, furthermore, such a guarantee would take effect if the United States, for its part, acted similarly.

It is to be regretted that the United States' initial reaction to the proposal concerning the creation of such a zone was not promising. Yet a regional approach to a ban on chemical weapons is encountering increasingly great support and attention. The appeals in September of the GDR and CSSR governments to the FRG Government containing a proposal concerning negotiations on the creation in Europe of a zone free of chemical weapons testify to this. The governments of both socialist states believe that it would be possible to achieve the liquidation of the chemical weapon stocks in this region and exclude the deployment on the European continent of new, extraordinarily dangerous types thereof, binary weapons primarily.

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CSO: 1816/03

SOVIET-GERMAN ROUNDTABLE ON WEST EUROPEAN ECONOMY, POLITICS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 80-97

[Roundtable in USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations: "West Europe in the Economy and Policy of Imperialism"*]

[Excerpts] The third international symposium (the first was conducted in 1981 in the FRG, the second in 1983 in the GDR) in which scholars of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) (USSR), Institute of Marxist Studies (Frankfurt-am-Main, FRG) and the Institute of International Politics and Economics (GDR) participated took place 11-14 July 1985 in the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO.

Prof V. Martynov, doctor of economic sciences, and Prof I. Guryev, doctor of economic sciences, both deputy directors of the IMEMO, Prof V. Shenayev, doctor of economic sciences and head of the Center for West European Studies, Prof Ye. Khesin, doctor of economic sciences, Prof Yu. Shishkov, doctor of economic sciences, S. Peregudov, doctor of historical sciences, N. Gauzner, doctor of economic sciences, V. Razmerov, doctor of historical sciences, N. Kishilov, candidate of historical sciences, Yu. Andreyev, candidate of economic sciences, V. Pankov, candidate of economic sciences, and other associates of the institute participated in the symposium on the Soviet side.

The delegation of the Institute of Marxist Studies was represented by Dr H. Jung, the director, Dr J. Hufschmidt, member of the institute council and professor of Bremen University, Prof F. Deppe, member of the institute council, and Doctors A. Soergel and K. Buterwegge, associates of the institute.

The GDR delegation included Prof L. Meier, deputy director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Prof R. Kowalski, head of the Department of Capitalist Reproduction Processes, Prof S. Schwarz, head of the International Relations Department, and Professors G. Basler and K. Klausnitzer, associates of the institute.

* The papers and speeches are published in abridged form.

Three groups of questions were discussed at the symposium: the economic, social and domestic policy problems of West Europe and also its role and place in international political relations.

The symposium was opened by V. Martynov, deputy director of the IMEMO. In recent decades, he said in his introductory remarks, on the one hand scholars have been able to observe an intensification of the general crisis of capitalism in many areas, on the other, imperialism has demonstrated the existence of big reserves. Neither an underestimation nor an overestimation of imperialism's capacity for adapting to new economic, social and political conditions may be allowed in a scientific Marxist analysis.

Compared with its imperialist rivals--the United States and Japan--West Europe, the motherland of capitalism, is in the most difficult position. A slowing of the economic growth rate and a decline in production efficiency may be observed here. The countries of the region have been hit by unemployment to a greater extent than other capitalist states. This is the reason for the powerful intensity of the social and political struggle.

It is essential in the discussion process, V. Martynov emphasized, to attempt to answer the question of whether West Europe's lag, particularly in the sphere of scientific-technical progress, is of a short-term nature or will be protracted. The procedural basis of the analysis is Lenin's law of uneven economic and political development under capitalism. Appreciable changes occurred in the action of this law on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's. In the sphere of the economy evolutionary development, primarily in industry, was replaced by revolutionary development. It is possible to speak of a new stage of the scientific-technical revolution. Whereas at its first stage (the 1950's-1960's) major achievements, mainly in the sphere of scientific research proper, were observed, the second stage (1970's-start of the 1980's) has been characterized by the active practical application of these achievements in industry (the introduction of electronics, automation, modernization based on computerization and deep-lying transformations in production engineering).

At the current stage the leader of scientific-technical progress is the United States. Nor is Japan, which is demonstrating a very high rate of assimilation of the results of scientific-technical progress, lagging behind it. There are serious problems for West Europe in this sphere.

The 1970's-start of the 1980's have been characterized by an exacerbation of the contradictions in the West European countries. The complex process of transition from one level of development of the production forces to a new, higher level is being accompanied by profound structural and particularly acute cyclical crises. The weakening of the positions of West European imperialism is entailing a growth of conservative trends in the official economic policy of the region's countries.

V. Martynov emphasized that the strengthening of American imperialism in the economic and military-political respects on the one hand and the weakening of West Europe in the triangle of forces of imperialist rivalry on the other represent a most essential feature of the development of capitalism in the past decade. It is necessary to take into consideration the existence not only of centripetal but also centrifugal forces.

Nor can the acute contradictions between capitalism and socialism be underestimated. Anticommunism and anti-Sovietism have become official doctrines in many West European countries. The struggle for the alternative to capitalism--socialism--under such conditions is made extraordinarily more complex. It is essential for the working class of the capitalist countries, the main force in this struggle, to rely on precise theoretical standpoints.

I. West Europe's Economic Problems

Paper of V. Shenayev (INEMO)

The role of West Europe in the economy and policy of the capitalist world has grown considerably in the postwar period as a whole. Its economic positions since WWII strengthened constantly right up to the mid-1970's. The region's economy has developed far more rapidly than that of the United States, although considerably slower than that of Japan. In terms of rate of growth of aggregate GNP and industrial production the United States has lagged behind not only the EEC but also the region as a whole. In terms of the share of world trade and currency reserves also West Europe has been superior to the United States. The position of the West European currencies in relation to the dollar has strengthened. The technology gap has shrunk and the buildup of national R&D has begun.

West Europe emerged from the 1974-1975 world economic crisis with the biggest losses, which led to changes in the correlation of forces of the three centers of interimperialist rivalry. Since the latter half of the 1970's West Europe has been inferior in terms of economic development rate to both Japan and the United States. As a result West Europe's share both of the GNP and the industrial production of the leading capitalist countries has declined in the past decade. Whereas in 1975 its share of the industry of the OECD countries constituted 45.8 percent, while that of the United States constituted 35.6 percent, in 1984 the figures were 41.8 percent and 37.8 percent respectively. This has been caused by a number of factors.

First of all, the restoration of the synchronism of the world cycle in the mid-1970's exacerbated the competitive struggle, which was reflected more severely in the West European countries' economy, which was integrated more in the world economy. The structural crisis, which hit primarily the traditional sectors (ferrous metallurgy, shipbuilding, the textile and footwear sectors and so forth), was once again reflected more severely in the states of the region, where there are more of the structurally ailing sectors and where the change toward science-intensive processes is occurring more slowly. In addition, it has proven more difficult for West Europe to solve global problems (energy, ecological and so forth). The deterioration in national conditions of the reproduction of capital prompted the countries of the region to expand exports of capital and transfer a considerable proportion of the production of the transnational corporations (TNC) abroad.

At the same time the temporary deterioration in West Europe's positions in the "triangle of forces" cannot be exaggerated. In terms of the volume of GNP, industrial production, international commodity turnover and the amount of gold-currency reserves and overseas private capital investments (since 1982) the region is even now ahead of the United States.

The nucleus of the West European power center--the EEC--has become, despite internal discord and conflicts, an important factor of the region's economy and policy. A numerical expansion of the EEC is under way: the "Nine" became the "Ten," and Spain and Portugal will become members in January 1986. The European Currency System, which was created in March 1979, attests certain successes in the currency sphere. The community countries are extending their influence in the developing world, employing more flexible methods of neocolonialism than the United States. West Europe's progressive forces are playing an important part in preserving the roots of the relaxation of international tension.

The present state of West Europe's economy may be characterized as transition to a phase of upturn. By the end of 1984 its industry as a whole had almost reached the precrisis level of mid-1980. An increase in industrial production of 3-3.5 percent and in GNP of 2-2.5 percent is anticipated in 1985, which will make it possible to surpass the peak of the preceding cycle.

As distinct from preceding years, the recovery has in the majority of countries been supported by a breakthrough in investment dynamics. Capital investments as a whole increased approximately 2 percent, primarily thanks to growth in the private sector. A considerably bigger increase is anticipated in 1985. Together with capital investments the production capacity load rose. At the same time in practically all countries the investments volume is below the precrisis level, while in some countries (France, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg) it continues to decline. The precrisis level as a whole will not be reached in the present year.

An important factor of economic growth has been exports, which expanded 7 percent last year and will increase by roughly the same amount in 1985. The export expansion of the West European monopolies, primarily in the United States, has been connected to a considerable extent with the decline in the exchange rate of the region's currencies in relation to the American dollar. Consumer demand is distinguished by instability. In the majority of countries its expansion is connected not with a growth of real wages but with savings and consumer credit.

The development of the economy is being held back, as before, by restrictive monetary-credit and financial policy. In many countries, particularly where conservatives are in office, social spending and state capital investments are being cut back. The outflow of capital from West Europe connected with the high interest rates on the American money market is exerting a negative influence on reproduction processes. The overpriced dollar is increasing the cost of commodity imports.

The nature and forms of capital depreciation merit particular attention in the present cycle.

The indicator of unused capacity is often more important than a reduction in investments. After all, the sum total of annual currency capital investments in the capitalist countries constitutes approximately 10 percent of the value of fixed capital. Consequently, if the production capacity load falls 10

percent (which occurred at the time of the 1980-1982 crisis), this is the equivalent of a loss of fixed capital of the order of all annual investments. A drop in capital investments, on the other hand, merely slows down the increase in fixed capital. The underload of production capacity is an indicator of both an overaccumulation of capital and simultaneously its depreciation since what is not used drops out of the reproduction process.

Another form of capital depreciation emerged under the conditions of the completed demonetization of gold. The devaluation of money is reflected directly in the monetary form of capital. The monopolies' attempt to obtain greater profits by way of raising the price of their products is intensifying the inflation process and, consequently, the depreciation of capital. As a result stagflation--inflation at a time of crisis and depression--appears. Upon emergence from crisis stagflation ends, but inflation does not, which means the permanency of the depreciation of capital in all phases of the cycle. This explains to a certain extent such a phenomenon as the absence of the mass replacement of capital in phases of recovery and upturn.

In the 1980's the capitalist countries have succeeded in lowering the rate of inflation somewhat and, consequently, the depreciation of capital. This has occurred primarily because inflation had approached a socially dangerous boundary. Real wages had been declining for several years in succession. The monopolies, however, had succeeded in raising the norm and bulk of profits. In a number of countries (United States, FRG, Great Britain) the reduction in inflation is explained to a considerable extent by the growth of the currency exchange rate and the reduced costs of imports. However, the reduction in the rate of monetary devaluation does not mean the elimination of inflation. In 1984 even its average level constituted 5.4 percent in the OECD countries and 7 percent in West Europe. This has caused the continuation of the high (approximately 10 percent) interest rates, which is usually not characteristic of phases of depression and recovery.

The present economic cycle in West Europe (like the preceding one also) is characterized by appreciable changes in the reproduction, technological and sectorial structures of capital. Changes in the reproduction structure of capital influence economic development more strongly than a decline in the amount of investments. In the 1980's in the FRG, for example, over four-fifths of capital investments have gone on the rationalization, modernization and replacement of fixed capital and only one-fifth on an expansion of production capacity, that is, the creation of additional jobs. This is characteristic of other capitalist countries also, which, in particular, serves as an important cause of increased unemployment. The technological structure of capital is undergoing considerable changes: the proportion of the active part thereof is growing, and the nature of the technology itself is changing also. These changes are connected most closely with the intersectorial and intrasectorial changes in the economy.

As of the mid-1970's scientific-technical progress has been materialized on the one hand in the growth of the science-intensive sectors and, on the other, in the transition to new technologies of the traditional base sectors. This process has come to be called "re-industrialization".

West Europe still lags behind the United States and Japan in the development of the science-intensive sectors. The slow pace of structural reorganization in the 1970's was connected both with the policy of the region's states in respect of support for the stagnating old sectors and with the OPEC countries' large-scale purchases of traditional investment commodities following the first "oil shock".

The West European states' economic policy has been changing in the 1980's and there has simultaneously been a decline in demand on the part of the OPEC countries inasmuch as their unpreparedness for a high rate of industrialization has been revealed. West Europe is speeding up the structural changes. The center of gravity has shifted to the modernization of the traditional base sectors, in which the region has always occupied strong positions.

The West European countries' endeavor to advance in biotechnology, which is as yet in an embryonic state, is being manifested distinctly. A biotechnology development office, whose expenditure on 67 projects was put at 9.1 million pounds sterling, was inaugurated in Great Britain in 1983 under the auspices of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. But the main emphasis is being put on the attraction of foreign firms specializing in the sphere of genetic engineering, particularly the American Genetics International, Eli Lilly and G.D. Searle.

A government biotechnology program was adopted in France in 1982 in which 3,500 public sector research workers, engineers and technicians are employed. More than Fr2.6 billion were allocated for the sector's development in 1983-1984 even. A program providing for the development of cooperation between member-countries in this sphere has been in effect within the EEC framework since 1984.

West Europe is lagging behind its rivals appreciably in the most important science-intensive sector--electronics. The adopted programs and large-scale expenditure on R&D of West European firms and the support on the part of the state testify to the intention to reduce the technology gap with the United States in the immediate future.

The most important socioeconomic problem of the West European countries remains the growth of unemployment. In the 1980's it has been connected to a greater extent with structural changes and the introduction of labor-saving technology than with cyclical factors. In 1985 the number merely of officially registered unemployed in the region has risen to 19 million (OECD data, including Turkey), including approximately 8 million persons aged 25 and under. The level of unemployment (over 11 percent) is markedly higher than the corresponding indicator for the United States and Japan.

Changes have occurred in the economic policy of the West European states and economic doctrines for the 1980's. Trends common to the three centers can be traced here: the increased influence of neoclassical doctrines, a modification of Keynesianism and the stimulation of institutionalism. A predominantly neo-Keynesian theoretical model has been employed in the countries of the region prior to the mid-1970's. The economic crises and inflation of the

mid-1970's strengthened the positions of monetarism and supply-side theory. Following the 1974-1975 crisis neoconservatives in West Europe abandoned state market-determined programs.

As of the end of the 1970's bourgeois economists have increased their attention to the fourth corner of the "magic square" of the goals of economic policy--the balanced nature of foreign payments. This has been a consequence of the exacerbation of the contradiction between national state regulation and the internationalization of capitalist reproduction processes, particularly under the conditions of restoration of the synchronism of the cycles. The supporters of the coordination of policy at the interstate regional level have asserted themselves in West Europe.

Two main versions of state-monopoly regulation are being employed currently in the countries of the region--the conservative version with the emphasis on market forces and limitation of the state's economic and social functions and the bourgeois-reformist version based on Keynesian theory.

As of the mid-1970's economic crises have exerted a restraining influence on the development of integration in West Europe. They have impeded the process of equalization of the member-countries' economic levels and the spread of integration in depth and sharply revealed structural and other differences. Separatist sentiments and endeavors to solve national problems at the expense of the partners have intensified. Such characteristics of integration as "slump," "sickness" and "Europessimism" have appeared in the press.

The centrifugal forces within the EEC have prompted its members to look for compromise. Various projects for increasing the coordination of economic policy were discussed at EEC summits in the 1980's, but the contradictions impeded an accord for a long time. A particularly difficult situation took shape following three "summit meeting" failures (Stuttgart in June 1983, Athens in December 1983 and Brussels in March 1984). The turning point came in June 1984 in Fontainebleu, where compromise solutions were finally adopted making it possible to deepen integration in budget policy, implement joint economic programs and also settle questions connected with the membership of Portugal and Spain.

The EEC is expanding the sphere of its influence in the developing world by way of collective neocolonialism, displaying greater flexibility here than the United States. Particular significance is attached to the three Lome conventions (1975, 1979 and 1985), which increased the zone of free trade with the Common Market to 66 states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific with associate-member status. A similar policy is being pursued in respect of states of the Mediterranean subregion (Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria) and the Near East (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel). Agreements have been concluded with countries of South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and Latin America (Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Mexico). As of the present the EEC has agreements with more than 80 countries of the developing world and their organizations.

As far as relations with the socialist states are concerned, West Europe accounts for four-fifths of their trade with the developed capitalist countries (approximately one-fourth of the USSR's entire foreign trade). For West Europe as a whole trade with the socialist countries constitutes approximately 5 percent of foreign trade turnover, and considerably more for individual states. Given the deterioration in the USSR's economic relations with the United States and Japan, the volume of the Soviet Union's relations with the capitalist countries has grown mainly thanks to West Europe in the 1980's.

In connection with the exacerbation of the international situation brought about by the aggressive policy of the U.S. Administration a duality of the West European governments' approach to the preservation and further development of economic relations with the CEMA countries is observed. On the one hand owing to "Atlantic solidarity" they are taking steps making these relations worse, on the other, they wish to preserve them. The positions of the United States and West Europe on the question of confrontation with the USSR and the other socialist countries do not coincide. This fact is of great significance for the foreign policy and foreign economic strategy of the socialist community states.

Speeches of the Participants

A detailed characterization of the current phase of the economic cycle in the West European countries was made by J. Hufschmidt (Institute of Marxist Studies, FRG). He noted that the economy of the region is in a state of upturn, but that this is a most weak and unstable cyclical upturn dependent on external conditions, primarily the economic situation in the United States. Despite the increase in business activity, unemployment continues to grow; the degree of production capacity load and labor productivity growth are lower than in periods of previous upturns; consumer demand is in a state of stagnation.

J. Hufschmidt advanced the proposition concerning the new type of capital accumulation which has emerged recently. It is characterized by a decelerated rate of the investment process and the predominant role of capital investments in the rationalization and modernization of production. Additional resources, given this type of accumulation, are not creating new jobs, which is holding back the growth of consumer demand.

In the speaker's opinion, two currents predominate in state economic policy--the neoclassical-conservative and the Keynesian-reformist. And the center of gravity, furthermore, is shifting toward the first current, which will determine the economic and social-political conditions of the capitalist economy's development through the end of the present decade. On the one hand this means an aspiration to a reduction in production costs in every possible way and, on the other, a change in socio-legal conditions to the detriment of the working people. The creation of conditions conducive to the self-growth of capital is becoming the basis of state intervention in the economy. A characteristic feature of this direction of economic policy is also the endeavor to increase international expansion (both via commodity exports and via the export of capital).

In connection with the exacerbation of the competitive struggle on the world market and the growing trend toward destruction of the national infrastructure under the influence of the activity of the TNC internal structures in the countries' economy are escaping from government control. Nonetheless, J. Hufschmidt believes, subsequently this should lead to the growth of the influence of the state on the economy, which currently has been reduced considerably.

K. Klausnitzer (Institute of International Politics and Economics, GDR) dwelt on problems of the competitiveness of the economy of West Europe in relation to the United States and Japan. Up to the mid-1980's the United States had extracted the juice from West Europe and undermined its competitiveness. However, a change in favor of the West European region is occurring now, the speaker believed. The economic growth rate is drawing closer and the collective use within the EEC framework of the achievements of scientific-technical progress is increasing. But interimperialist contradictions are intensifying extraordinarily.

R. Kowalski (Institute of International Politics and Economics, GDR) expressed his thoughts concerning the problem of the technology gap between West Europe on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. He called attention to the political content of the problem of the technology lag since the government and the monopolies of the United States are taking advantage of this gap as a means of political pressure on the West European countries. It is essential to view the technology gap problem in dual fashion: from the viewpoint of the development of R&D itself, the development of new technology and so forth and also from the viewpoint of application of the results of scientific-technical progress in specific sectors of the economy in which West Europe (including the FRG) could have, in his opinion, quite favorable prospects. Importance is attached in this connection to an analysis of the measures of state economic policy which contribute to structural reorganization and the application of the results of scientific-technical progress in the economy of West Europe.

V. Pankov (IMEMO) believes that it is essential to distinguish the sociopolitical and economic aspects of the problem of the technology gap. It exists in some of the latest sectors even. A certain "alarmism" is being whipped up in West Europe currently in respect of this problem. The inspirers of these sentiments are conservative circles, which are endeavoring to prove to the governments in every possible way that the surmounting of the lag demands an acceleration of the development of integration processes in depth and the pursuit of a policy of strict economies in the social sphere. V. Pankov noted also the existence of a connection between the length of the technology lag and integration development processes. In his opinion, the gap may be reduced only if in the next few years changes in West European integration in depth, particularly in the political sphere, take shape.

A. Soergel (Institute of Marxist Studies, FRG) supported the opinion concerning the dual aspect of West Europe's technology lag. She noted that the problem of the technology gap exists in the FRG also, although to a lesser extent than in other countries of the region.

Ye. Khesin (INEMO) spoke about the fact that West Europe's technology lag behind the United States undoubtedly exists and that overcoming it will be very difficult primarily owing to the lag in the growth of labor productivity and also owing to the absence in West Europe of a capacious market, which the sale of technical innovations demands. Such a market exists in the United States and Japan, but West Europe remains an aggregate of individual national markets. Thus the problem of equalization of the technical and technological levels will largely depend on the development of West European integration. However, there has been a sharp increase recently in the internationalization of economic life. This process is going beyond the framework of the West European region (the activity of the TNC and the existence of a ramified system of institutional structures coordinating the capitalist countries' economic policy), which is reducing incentives for the development of West European integration.

As Yu. Shishkov (INEMO) observed, in terms of the size of GNP the "Ten" have reached the 1980 precrisis level, but its economic growth rate is far lower than in the 1976-1979 intercrisis period. In terms of industrial production the EEC countries as a whole have not yet reached the precrisis level. This testifies to the lower efficiency of the West European economy compared with the American and Japanese economies and the lower competitiveness of West European industry.

In Yu. Shishkov's opinion the application of the latest equipment and technology is being impeded in the West European region by the lag in the development of R&D and the increased outflow of capital from the region. This is not only draining its economy--the West European monopolies' hope of associating themselves with the higher technology across the Atlantic is "sealing" the lag within the region. Furthermore, there are difficulties of a social nature. The problem of unemployment is far more acute in the West European countries than in the United States and Japan, and the introduction of new technology is increasing the social contradictions even more.

L. Meier (Institute of International Politics and Economics, GDR) pointed to the interconnection between the development of West European integration and the processes occurring under the influence of the activity of the TNC. He characterized the differences of the following levels of integration: national, EEC and international corporations and organizations. In his opinion, the latter form of integration has the biggest prospects. With the formation of the EEC internationalization in West Europe intensified and began to develop quite rapidly within the framework of the grouping. Now this process has decelerated somewhat under the influence of the TNC. The growth of the interweaving of sums of capital is eliminating the impact of integration measures.

As far as the prospects for West European integration are concerned, its development in depth, in the field of political integration, is unlikely, L. Meier believes. A negative influence on these processes is being exerted by the unstable political situation in many EEC countries. The speaker expressed the supposition that in the future the positions of certain West European countries will strengthen. In this connection he raised the question

of the topicality of the "West European power center" concept. L. Meier dwelt on the procedural aspects of a comparison of the positions of the three power centers. He noted that a precise uniform methodology of such a comparison has yet to be formulated.

Yu. Andreyev (IMEMO) supported R. Kowalski's opinion that the approach to the problem of West Europe's technology lag should be a dual one. If we analyze the level of application of R&D, all the main capitalist countries are roughly equal in terms of this indicator. It is more a question of the problem of the West European economy's dependence on the latest American equipment and technology and not of a lag in its application. It is now possible to speak of the formation of an "Atlantic economic center" (the United States' East Coast and West Europe) and a "Pacific economic center" (the West Coast of the United States, Japan and the "new industrial countries"). The United States is represented in both centers, which is for it an appreciable advantage and very unpropitious for West Europe. As far as East-West relations are concerned, the state of economic relations depends, as Yu. Andreyev emphasized, to a large extent on the political situation and the fate of detente, whose root system has been preserved.

F. Deppe (Institute of Marxist Studies, FRG) emphasized that the problems of the West European region's economic development cannot be confined to an analysis of the technology gap between West Europe on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. It is necessary to study the crisis development of capitalism inasmuch as crisis is encompassing all spheres--economic, social, political and cultural. The surmounting of the technology lag (if this is happening) will not remove the acute contradictions of capitalist reproduction. It is necessary in this connection to pay particular attention to study of the new type of capital accumulation, about which J. Hufschmidt spoke. The specific features of this new type of accumulation of capital will be manifested increasingly clearly in the next few years.

As V. Martynov (IMEMO) observed, the main difficulty for the communist movement in the capitalist countries now is that it is essential to formulate a progressive alternative to the scientific-technical revolution which is unfolding under the conditions of capitalism. The intensifying problem of unemployment is one which directly concerns the interests of the working class.

As far as the question of West Europe's technology lag is concerned, the evaluations of the extent thereof may differ, of course. However, as a whole the West European region (including the FRG) lags behind its main competitors--the United States and Japan. In the future everything will depend on the way in which each power center adapts to accelerating scientific-technical progress. The latter is being manifested most strikingly in the science-intensive sectors--the basis for technological innovations in the economy. Whoever occupies the leading positions here will dominate in the base sectors also. The traditional sectors are undergoing the most complete reorganization based on the new organization of the production process.

Speaking of the development of integration, V. Martynov drew attention to the existence of two trends: greater internationalization at concern level and the intensification of integration processes at the interstate level. In his opinion, the second trend will predominate in the future.

In the closing speech on the first group of questions S. Schwarz (Institute of International Politics and Economics, GDR) noted that the process of West European integration has certain, albeit limited, development prospects. The West European monopolies will continue to support it inasmuch as they endeavor to suppress the democratic and antimonopoly movement within the EEC framework and also act jointly in the political arena against the socialist community countries. At present we may speak merely of the development of integration processes in breadth. As far as their development in depth is concerned (primarily the emergence of supranational political bodies), it is as yet difficult to introduce any clarity to this question.

II. Social and Domestic Political Problems

Paper Prepared by K. Buterwegge, F. Deppe, A. Soergel and H. Jung, Associates of the Institute of Marxist Studies, FRG

Together with appreciable differences in the social situation and measures of social policy, which depend on the level of development of the production forces and the correlation between labor and capital, homogeneous trends in these spheres are revealed in each West European country. The social differences between individual members of the EEC are extraordinarily great and they will grow even more following the community's enlargement at the expense of the South European states.

An important problem for the West European countries is unemployment. The number of unemployed here has reached almost 20 million persons or 10.9 percent of the population. Unemployment is particularly high among young people (42 percent) and women. However, the adduced figures do not include an additional number of groups of unemployed. These include the "job seekers" category, various forms of hidden unemployment, which are prevalent in the South European countries, and so forth.

In our opinion, the working class and the unions are not presently experiencing a "profound crisis". The major strikes of 1984-1985 in the FRG, Great Britain and Denmark testify to an upsurge of the class struggle. As these strikes showed, any struggle for the elementary vital interests of the working class becomes a direct confrontation with the ruling conservative bloc.

Four types of political or government blocs may be distinguished in West Europe: 1. Countries with ruling social democratic and socialist parties adhering in the struggle against the crisis to Keynesian concepts of demand, in somewhat modified form, it is true. Among these are Sweden, Austria, Finland and Greece. 2. Countries with ruling social democratic and socialist parties which have largely abandoned reformist concepts and methods of reviving demand and which are proceeding along a path of adaptation to the conservative course. These are France, Portugal and Spain. 3. Countries where the governments are headed by Christian democratic, conservative parties.

Among these are the FRG, Italy (despite the fact that the present prime minister is a socialist), Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, and Benelux countries and Switzerland. As development shows, the stability of the ruling blocs is quite limited, and their political base is unstable. 4. Countries with ruling conservative or, more precisely, neoconservative parties attempting to openly and strictly pursue the policy of monopoly capital.

As far as the role of the communists and socialist forces of a left persuasion in this reformist bloc are concerned, it depends on the strength of their parliamentary and extra-parliamentary positions, particularly on their capacity for playing an important part in mass movements and elaborating an acceptable concept of struggle against "social revenge" and the crisis of capitalism.

Supporting Paper of S. Peregudov (INEMO)

The present political situation in the West European countries is largely determined by the actual correlation of forces which is taking shape between the parties and currents accustomed to political power, that is, primarily the conservatives and social democrats. I believe that despite the quite significant differences which exist between Christian democratic parties (of the CDU type in the FRG) and conservative parties proper (of the British Tories type), there are grounds for speaking of a general neoconservative current in West Europe.

Practically all parties of contemporary conservatism are characterized by what may be called a policy of "social segregation". Its essence consists of the counterposing of some detachments of the working class to others and attempts to introduce a profound split in its ranks. Measures of a repressive nature are being brought down on the least-defended detachments of working people and also workers of the sectors which are experiencing a structural crisis and which are simultaneously a bastion of the traditional nucleus of the working class. In respect of the working people, however, who find themselves under the most favorable conditions a flexible policy of partial concessions, advances and sometimes plain bribery even is pursued.

Such tactics and the accompanying demagoguery have produced for the neoconservatives quite tangible fruit, and in a number of cases they have succeeded in splitting the working class for a time. I refer to the example of the British Conservatives. At the time of the 1983 General Election 36 percent of the vote of skilled workers, who constitute Laborism's main social base, was cast for the Labor Party. Some 39 percent of the workers of this category, however, voted for the Conservatives, who enjoy considerably less influence in this environment. Of course, such a striking departure from the Labor Party by traditional working class supporters was also caused by a number of other factors, not least the crisis state of the party itself and the masses' disenchantment with its policy. In addition, there are grounds even now for speaking of its fading effectiveness.

The Conservatives' persistent attempts to cut public spending on social needs and dismantle the system of state services which has been built up since the war are having a boomerang effect against them. Growing anxiety in the masses is being engendered by the Conservatives' increasingly avowed militarism and

their unconstructive foreign policy course. As is known, at the recent local elections in the FRG and Great Britain conservatives incurred substantial losses. And public opinion polls testify that their influence on the electorate, particularly working class voters, is diminishing markedly. As a consequence, internal disagreements have intensified and the relatively moderate forces opposed to the strict antiworker policy have bestirred themselves in the milieu of the conservatives. Let us again take the British example, which is all the more interesting in that neoconservatism here appears, if it may be so put, in pure form. A new group calling itself the "progressive center group" banded together in the Tory Party in May 1985. It is headed by an influential party figure, F. Pym, former foreign minister, and numbers in its ranks approximately 30 members of parliament. Pym's speech on the formation of the group contains an appeal for more active state intervention in the socioeconomic sphere for the purpose of accelerating economic growth and the rapid development of new technology and, on this basis, a return to a policy of "social partnership," an alleviation of social contrasts and the resorption of unemployment. According to Pym's assertion, these views are shared by the leadership of the CBI and also the top management of the major ICI and General Electric corporations.

None of this should by any means be interpreted as a desire to return to the old Keynesian-reformist course. What it is is a maneuver whose essence could be defined as an endeavor to form something like a centrist alternative (or, more precisely, pseudo-alternative) to neoconservatism, taking as the basis thereof a so-called Keynesian-monetarist synthesis.

The deepening delineation among conservatives is not of a market-related but a far more profound nature reflecting the growth of contradictions in the ruling class. But although the peak of the neoconservatives' political influence has, to judge by everything, passed, it is still too early to say that it has already sharply declined. In some countries neoconservatives are in power, and defeating them will obviously not be that simple. In others, like France, they are straining after power. In yet others they are appreciably influencing the policy course, acting in coalition with bourgeois-liberal parties.

Further political development both in individual countries and in the region as a whole will largely depend on the kind of changes which are undergone by social democracy, the extent to which it is prepared to dispute power with the conservatives and the alternative to them which it elaborates and proposes. The crisis of the reformist methods of the solution of socioeconomic problems based on Keynesianism has complicated the position of social reformism considerably and weakened its mass base. However, it would be an oversimplification to regard the situation in the social democratic camp merely from the viewpoint of the difficulties which it is experiencing. In recent years there has been an appreciable modification in the social democratic parties of their social and political base, intraparty relations and ideological-political priorities.

The narrowing of influence in the milieu of workers of physical labor has been compensated to a considerable extent by a strengthening of positions in the environment of white-collar workers, employees and the intelligentsia and

also technical specialists and civil servants. It is thanks to these categories that the bulk of the membership of the social democratic and socialist parties and their leading personnel have been replenished in recent years. The number of votes which they have received from workers of nonphysical labor and the middle strata has increased, albeit extremely unevenly.

At the same time, however, there has been increased interaction with new social movements, antiwar primarily. Although such an expansion of relations with the mass movement has in certain instances caused a growth of intraparty disagreements, as a whole it has contributed to a strengthening of the left wing, its increased influence on the party leadership and more active protests against militarism and the nuclear arms race.

There are many indications that following a quite protracted period of decline in the political assertiveness of West Europe's trade unions it is now growing and that the interest of the unions and their leadership in politics and in strengthening relations with social democracy is increasing. A left-radical current connected with the new militant spirit in the workers and democratic movements is also strengthening in some parties.

Social democracy's turn to the left has not, however, led to a change in its class-collaborationist essence. Nor have the positions of its right wing, which has begun to orient itself to a large extent toward the technocracy and "new bureaucracy" and the specialized work force, been undermined. Its attempts to interest influential business circles, particularly those connected with the new technology, in its plans have been stepped up. The broadening of the social and political base of social democracy is contributing to increased differentiation both within the party and between parties. In the French Socialist Party there are, according to some calculations, four and, according to others, five and even more currents; disputes concerning the way to proceed further are increasing. True, a trend toward consolidation is gaining the ascendancy in the majority of other parties.

The complex, contradictory situation in West German social democracy does not permit a straightforward evaluation of what is happening in it. As a whole, however, it may be noted that the attempts of the neoconservatives to emphatically put the squeeze on the social democrats in the political arena have not succeeded. Social democracy has not only preserved its influence but, thanks to expanded relations with the mass movement, has come to be more responsive to pressure from below.

Disruption of the political consensus between the conservatives and social democrats which existed earlier, exacerbation of the interparty struggle and political polarization have contributed to the preservation and in some places the pronounced strengthening of the role of the political center. In Great Britain, for example, it has been entrusted with the "mission" of replacing the Labor Party, which has lost the confidence of influential establishment circles as the more dependable partner of the Conservatives in the two-party system. It is well known also what important functions have been and continue to be performed by the FDP in the FRG.

The polarization of party-political forces, which intensified on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's, has created more favorable conditions for "centrism," which has attempted to fill the vacuum which formed. There is also a common ideological-theoretical basis feeding centrism. This is the Keynesian-monetarist synthesis which I mentioned in connection with the Pym grouping and which in this version or the other is characteristic not only of moderate conservatives but also rightwing social democrats, not to mention the liberals belonging to the center.

Granted all the markedly increased assertiveness of the "ultras" and their support on the part of certain strata of the population, particularly the declassé youth, there is hardly reason to believe that they all or some part of them will in the next few years become a force which will begin to determine the political development of this West European country or the other. Their social and political base remains quite narrow. Nonetheless, the danger which the contemporary "ultras" represent can by no means be underestimated. They are making very skillful use of the masses' disenchantment with "respectable" governments and the capability of bourgeois-democratic systems and will exert growing efforts to increase their political "muscle" in case of a further exacerbation of sociopolitical contradictions and the emergence of acute conflict situations.

The complex social and political situation is confronting the communist parties with difficult problems. The crisis of social reformism has contributed to a weakening of the "Eurocommunist" class-collaborationist trends which predominated in a number of West European communist parties in the 1970's. Simultaneously the growth of social and political tension is contributing to a strengthening of the forces adhering to consistently class positions.

Speeches of the Participants

N. Gauzner (IMEMO) observed that the strict pursuit of a neoconservative policy in a number of West European countries has served as a cause of the higher level of unemployment compared with the United States and Japan. The hopes that a reduction in or limitation of the growth of wages would contribute to a stimulation of the investment process and increased employment have not been justified. The unfolding of the "microprocessor revolution" is also confronting the workers movement with a number of problems. Whence the need for a revision of the forms and methods of struggle and the advancement of new demands. An important place among them is occupied by the demand for public control over the development, introduction and use of new technology.

Great significance is attached to the unions' struggle for the working people's genuine participation in the control of production and reduction of the work week. N. Gauzner also dwelt on the changes in the structure of the working class and adduced a number of factors testifying that together with the increased differentiation of the working class the opposite trend toward its homogenization connected with the prevalence of "all-around" occupations, the reduction in the differences in the socioeconomic position of workers and employees and the growing socialization of labor may be observed also.

J. Hufschmidt analyzed the question of the uneven nature of the economic and social development of individual capitalist countries and their groupings, emphasizing that this unevenness is influencing the solution of social problems both at enterprise and corporation level and within a national and regional framework. At the same time the internationalization of social problems has become an obvious reality. Their effective solution, which the forces of the left advocate, is in many cases possible only on an international scale.

The speech of Doctor of Historical Sciences N. Ivanov (IMEMO) was devoted to the problem of a democratic alternative to the rightwing-conservative course. A key question is the possibility of a halt to the arms race and the reorientation of economic and scientific-technical policy toward the solution of most acute socioeconomic problems like the creation of jobs, an improvement in living and work conditions and the development of the education, health care and social security systems.

Under the conditions of the increasing internationalization of the world economy connected with the current stage of development of the production forces the struggle against the TNC and for a strengthening of world-economic relations for the purpose of a solution of such global problems as the elimination of hunger, aid to the developing countries and environmental protection is becoming increasingly urgent. At the same time, however, the internationalization of capital and the consolidation of reactionary forces in the world arena objectively demand the increased internationalization of the international workers and democratic movements for defense of the interests of the working people and their concerted actions.

Candidate of Historical Sciences S. Sokolskiy (IMEMO) observed that the process of West European integration has engendered centripetal trends in West Europe's trade union movement. They led to the formation in 1973 of the European Confederation of Trade Unions, which in 1985 embraced 35 national trade union centers of 21 West European countries and numbered 43 million members. A principal purpose of the West European trade union movement consists of defense at the regional level of the working people's interests and demands which in connection with the far-advanced process of the internationalization of production and capital and the activity of the TNC are increasingly difficult to defend within national boundaries.

But the "supranational" collective negotiations are encountering the extremely guarded and often frankly negative attitude of the TNC and employer unions. Difficulties for the trade unions also emanate from the dissimilar conditions and practice of the regulation of labor relations in different countries and the absence for multinational collective agreements of any firm legal basis. Although the unions have in recent years scored certain successes in this sphere, the collective-bargaining regulation of labor relations at EEC level is still at the initial stage.

F. Deppe cited a number of facts illustrating the negative influence being exerted on the activity of West Europe's inter-nation trade union associations by the union bureaucracy, which is closely linked with the leadership of the socialist and social democratic parties. These trade union associations have been created from above and have not been based on the international working

class movement. The rightwing-reformist leaders of the West European trade union centers frequently block the initiatives of national trade union organizations.

L. Meier emphasized particularly that it is now, when considerable additions to the EEC treaty have to be made, that it is essential for the communists, social democrats and the trade unions to make vigorous efforts to weaken the influence of the conservatives on the activity of the integration bodies and the shaping of their legal foundations. The democratic alternative must incorporate society's control over scientific-technical progress and defense of national interests against the hegemony of the United States. Disagreement in the ranks of the left are making use of the EEC's bourgeois-democratic institutions in the interests of the antimonopoly struggle more difficult.

In the opinion of V. Pankov, social democracy experienced a profound crisis on the eve and at the outset of the 1970's. It was caused by the adaptation of social democratic doctrines to the requirements of capitalism's postwar development expressed in the "de-ideologization" of the socialist and social democratic parties. Contemporary social democracy is in the process of emerging from the crisis. The search is under way in the most diverse directions.

H. (sic) Buterwegge observed that "ecoreformism" represents merely one of social democracy's possible answers to the crisis which it is experiencing. Another possibility of surmounting the crisis consists of the implementation of measures similar to those which determine the policy of the social democratic parties of Scandinavia and Austria, that is, a strengthening of the public sector of the economy.

A. Soergel illustrated in detail the complex mutual relations between the workers movement and the new social movements (antiwar, ecology, women's and others) opposed to the aggressive and reactionary trends in imperialism's foreign and domestic policy. At the same time anticommunist prejudices are quite widespread in a number of these movements, and they frequently have a hostile attitude toward the unions and the organized workers movement. This is impeding the formation of a firm alliance of all antimonopoly and democratic forces.

The speakers came to the conclusion concerning the need for a further in-depth analysis of the correlation between the centripetal and centrifugal trends in the economy and policy of the West European countries for the formulation of a scientifically substantiated democratic and antimonopoly alternative.

III. The Role and Place of West Europe in International Relations

Paper Prepared by G. Basler and S. Schwarz, Associates of the Institute of International Politics and Economics, GDR

A most complex problem in the study of West Europe as an imperialist center is the interconnection between its internal condition and its role in the international arena. As distinct from the United States and Japan, the West

European region lacks a uniform state and political structure and is constituted into a multitude of large, medium and small countries. The nucleus of the region is formed by the 10 and, as of 1986, 12 countries of the EEC, which act in the international arena as a relatively cohesive grouping.

Throughout the latter half of the 1970's and particularly in the 1980's the internal and external conditions of the process of economic integration of the EEC countries have changed appreciably. The reduction in the economic growth rate and the pronounced rise in the level of inflation have exacerbated the competitive struggle and increased domestic protectionism. Relations with the United States and Japan are frequently turning into "trade wars". The Common Market countries are in terms of many indicators inferior to their rivals, primarily in the mass introduction and use of modern technology. At the same time, however, West Europe occupies leading positions in the capitalist world's foreign trade.

It also needs to be borne in mind that the EEC preserves its magnetic force for certain groupings of the developing countries also. The community appears to them as a kind of "positive alternative" to the United States with its aggressive strategy, which gives rise to criticism on the part of these countries.

External factors giving rise to the need to preserve the EEC and forcing the member-countries to increase coordination in all spheres are operating together with numerous economic, financial and legal factors.

Internal factors are prompting a political structure of the community primarily because solution of the problems on the agenda in conformity with the goals of monopoly strategy is inevitably exacerbating the class struggle, intensifying the conflicts within the bourgeoisie and increasing the confrontation between the participants. Individual governments and groups of members of parliament are attempting again and again to achieve qualitative changes in the process of West European integration, but, as the facts testify, they have not as yet managed to achieve much.

Although the EEC is experiencing serious difficulties and markedly lagging in terms of the level of competitiveness behind the other imperialist centers, it is, therefore, an important element in the system of international relations.

Significant aspects in relations with the socialist community states appeared in the strategy of the main countries of the West European center at the frontier in the 1980's. This was connected both with the growing pressure of the United States and the strengthening of rightwing-conservative trends in the thinking and policy of the ruling circles of many West European NATO states. The anti-socialist community of the United States and West Europe is being manifested in the endeavor to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact states, the unparalleled expansion of the arms race and the intensification of the ideological struggle against the socialist community.

At the same time it should be noted that the policy of confrontation with the socialist countries being imposed by Washington is being implemented under conditions of constant struggle between West European countries and also between them and the United States surrounding the content, forms and methods of actions in the confrontation of the two systems in the international arena. The West European countries are attempting to defend their particular interests and dissociate themselves on certain issues from the aggressive policy of the United States. They are attempting to adhere, albeit often highly inconsistently, to their own political persuasion. Where from their viewpoint East-West cooperation promises benefits, the West European countries are not supporting actions of the United States aimed at dismantling these relations or, on the other hand, having been forced to associate themselves with them, are attempting to somehow alleviate the negative consequences of confrontation.

Nor is there a complete identity of interests between the United States and West Europe on security issues. Together with common purposes in the sphere of foreign and military policy both sides are also pursuing their own ends. Discussion is unfolding primarily around the question of whether security should be confined merely to the military aspect (as the United States believes) or whether a broader political-economic aspect is essential (as the majority of West Europeans believes).

A complex and contradictory process of a review of long-term strategic and policy goals has begun in West Europe. Despite numerous restrictions, there are conditions and points of departure here capable of serving to invigorate the detente process.

Increasingly great urgency is attached to the question of the prospects of cooperation in the sphere of military policy. In the opinion of the ruling circles of the main EEC countries, a center should be set up which, although pursuing a policy in the security sphere relatively independent of the United States, would at the same time strengthen NATO politically in the confrontation between socialism and capitalism. This was confirmed in April 1985, when the foreign and defense ministers of the members of the Western European Union (which includes the majority of EEC countries) again advanced the demand for the creation of a West European "power center," which would be relatively independent, but nonetheless closely linked with the United States. The appearance of such an imperialist center of military policy in West Europe would contain a threat to the socialist community and the progressive regimes of the developing countries.

The strengthening of the West European component within the Atlantic alliance pursues the goal of counteracting the danger of becoming totally dependent on the United States on vitally important issues and becoming a nuclear battlefield. This danger became more real with the start of the deployment of the new American intermediate-range missiles on the territory of West European states. It is perceived even by conservative politicians who consented to the deployment of the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles. Many of them are beginning to understand that neither military superiority nor political advantages can be achieved this way.

Their fears are being intensified by the policy of confrontation being pursued by the U.S. Administration. For this reason the West European NATO countries have endeavored and continue to endeavor to have the United States soften its too rigid policy and extend dialogue and business cooperation with the socialist states and are advocating disarmament and arms control negotiations for the purpose of reducing the risk of the outbreak of a military conflict in Europe.

However, the West European arguments and actions are influencing Washington's policy only to a negligible extent. There are no concerted institutional methods of ensuring the EEC countries' influence on the strategic, political and economic decisions of the United States. In this connection the community is confronted with the task of increasing its influence to win the adoption of political decisions which take account of its interests to a greater extent.

Serious new differences between West Europe and the United States are being caused by the United States' plans for the militarization of space and its demands that the West European countries participate in the corresponding research.

Despite certain reservations, the FRG Government is in principle inclined to participate in the R&D within the framework of the new "strategic defense initiative" (SDI). It gives as the reason for this primarily the need to eliminate the technology lag behind the United States. The governments of France and Great Britain have expressed serious doubts on this score. They fear that the development and deployment of the SDI system could appreciably reduce the significance of the French and British nuclear potentials. Denmark and Norway have officially refused to cooperate in this project.

An important reason for the EEC countries' cooperation in the security sphere is the need for the further development of the pooling of military production. In our day even the big West European states are not in a position to realize costly arms programs by their own forces. The driving force of the development of the EEC countries' cooperation in the arms sphere is the intensifying competitive struggle with the American foreign monopolies. The marked lag of the community countries in arms production and scientific-technical facilities is forcing them to unite their efforts increasingly often.

However, there is a number of contradictions and barriers making the process of West European cooperation in the arms sphere difficult. The main one is the endeavor of each monopoly, groups of monopolies and states to secure more profits and benefits precisely for themselves.

The West European states' endeavor to develop military cooperation partly in circumvention of NATO inasmuch as the bloc's mechanism is being used by the U.S. monopolies in their own interests has been pronounced in recent years. Thus the European interaction in the sphere of supply of conventional weapons and a strengthening of joint research policy for the purpose of closing the technology gap with the United States.

The cooperation of the EEC's military monopolies is increasing also. Approximately 10 percent of West European arms projects is realized by way of cooperation. Relations in the arms sphere between France and the FRG are intensifying. The institutionalization of the two states' military-political cooperation begun in October 1982 has progressed most in the sphere of arms cooperation. These countries regard cooperation in security policy as an instrument for strengthening the Atlantic alliance and a means of improving their position in international affairs.

Supporting Paper of N. Kishilov (IMEMO)

I would like to specially highlight and support the concept of "security" in the broad meaning of this word advanced in the paper by G. Basler and S. Schwarz and the idea that a process of the rethinking of this concept in the direction of its orientation not toward the requirements of global American strategy but toward its own interests has been under way in West Europe for many months now.

This by no means signifies that the West European NATO countries are following their own military-political course, isolated from the United States, within the framework of an independent West European center. The formation of such a center is a lengthy process, and its temporal parameters, in our view, go beyond the framework of the current century. Nonetheless, as the above-mentioned paper rightly observes, although the West European countries are basically following the U.S. course of confrontation, disagreements are arising between the two imperialist centers. They concern, in particular, the methods and forms of the pursuit of this course, particularly on the European continent, and the West European states' relations with the socialist community countries.

The situation on the European continent remains complex. Tension not only continues but is increasing to a certain extent, and the military threat is growing. There are many reasons for this. Some of a relatively long-term nature, others were born of the policy of the U.S. Administration at the end of the 1970's-first half of the 1980's.

Characterizing the "balance of military forces at the European level" concept, the speaker analyzed certain factors thereof, the strategic balance between the USSR and the United States at the global level and the place occupied therein by the factor of the balance of military forces in Europe. The main components of the strategic balance are the sides' strategic forces (both offensive and defensive types of weapons). Parity has existed in the sphere of strategic forces of the USSR and the United States since the end of the 1960's-start of the 1970's. It was carefully checked throughout the period of the SALT I and SALT II talks and enshrined in a number of treaties and agreements signed between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The evolved strategic balance at the global level, whose integral elements are regional resources, does not automatically lead to a balance of military forces at the regional, in this case European, level. Furthermore, the differences in the strategic potentials of the USSR and the United States are supplemented by geostrategic asymmetry between the two powers. As distinct

from the USSR, the United States can deliver nuclear strikes at targets on the territory of the other side not only with the aid of strategic intercontinental arms but also with the use of medium-range nuclear missiles and aircraft deployed in direct proximity to the Soviet borders.

What determines the balance of military forces at the European level and what, in turn, are its integral elements? In respect of the European region they are primarily the medium-range (and also tactical) nuclear systems belonging to the Soviet Union on the one hand (the other Warsaw Pact states do not have such systems) and the NATO nuclear countries (United States, Great Britain and France) on the other. The armed forces and arms of the participants in the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries both as a whole and in Central Europe--the main area of confrontation of the two military-political groupings--are also elements of the balance of military forces at the European level.

The basis of the military-political course of the West European NATO countries is their defense of the "need" for the North Atlantic alliance and its military organization. The disagreements arise more upon determination of the correlation of the roles of the United States and the West European states in the North Atlantic alliance and the actual forms of combination of Atlantic and West European relations. And although the policy of the preservation of NATO, the present-day structure of the alliance and the traditions which have evolved therein remains predominant, this does not mean that the West European countries intend in the military-political sphere to continue to follow the United States.

What has changed primarily is the very system of leadership and subordination which evolved in the North Atlantic alliance in the past (as is known, by the 1980's the West European center of imperialism was not only on a par economically with the United States in terms of the main indicators but had surpassed it in certain spheres). Then there was an exacerbation of the competitive struggle and an increase in and expansion of the range of differences in the two centers' accomplishment of common imperialist goals. Thus the West European NATO countries began to display considerably greater independence in the pursuit of policy in respect of the East European socialist countries and the developing states.

Furthermore, the process of "erosion" of the United States' hegemony in NATO, in the nuclear sphere included, has been manifested sufficiently clearly. The continuing process of the deployment of American Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles and the U.S. leadership's persistent imposition on its West European allies of the initiative in the space sphere are explained rather by its endeavor to restore its leading positions in respect of the West European NATO countries, at least in the military-political sphere, and to do away with or lessen the centrifugal forces here.

If this problem is viewed from the positions of the West European countries, as a whole, they are interested in pursuing a military-political course which is not attended by dangerous military conflict brinkmanship. Of course, this approach varies in different countries depending on the international situation

and on who is in power. Nonetheless, it is stimulating attempts to coordinate the positions of the West European allies, at EEC level included, in advance and contributing to the formulation of a relatively more restrained policy compared with the United States in questions of military confrontation and in evaluations of the policy of the Soviet Union.

Things are different in the sphere of military-industrial cooperation. A highly material trend has been discerned in the past 20 years in the approach of the governments, defense ministries and large firms of the leading West European states--an increased orientation toward the development of military-political cooperation within the framework of West Europe. This applies particularly to the production of new arms systems. Whereas in the 1950's--start of the 1960's the two main channels of obtaining arms for the West European countries were national production and purchases thereof in the United States, in the past decade joint West European production, at least for Britain, France, the FRG and Italy, was an important source catering to a considerable extent for air force rearmament.

These countries' active use of various forms of military-industrial cooperation has led not only to the rapid expansion of production relations between the firms and state enterprises participating in joint projects but also to the emergence of a number of inter-nation West European consortia. The latter, in turn, have become leading suppliers of individual arms systems. The exchange of information and licenses and the coordination of plans for the production of arms and military equipment have assumed expansive forms.

The process of the intensification and expansion of military-industrial cooperation is being coordinated in a substantial volume by special intergovernmental bodies formed in the 1970's. The said trend reflects the increased possibilities of the West European states' military industry and the formation of close interconnections in the military-industrial sphere. It is part of the integration process in West Europe and is itself exerting considerable influence on this process. The development of cooperation in the military-industrial sphere of the leading West European countries may be seen as a certain strengthening of their positions in NATO as a whole and in relation to the United States, particularly in the sphere of production of the latest arms systems, where the Americans would like preserve the "one-way street".

With the formation in 1976 of the European Programming Group (EPG), which includes France also, the West European countries' military-political cooperation acquired certain systemic forms and is showing a trend toward growth. Even if in the future the EPG's activity is confined to the coordination of long-term rearmament plans and the search for possibilities (scientific-technical, production, financial and others) of the realization of joint projects, it is nonetheless possible to speak of an important change in the system of regulation of West European military-industrial cooperation. This may to a certain extent be seen as an endeavor on the part of the West European countries' ruling circles to create a "mechanism" of military-industrial cooperation here within whose framework, given the preservation of national prerogatives, it might be possible to formulate a common policy and joint long-term and short-term plans and to monitor their implementation.

Speeches of the Participants

West Europe's positions in the triangle of imperialist rivalry have weakened markedly in the present decade compared with the 1970's, Candidate of Historical Sciences M. Ziborova (IMEMO) observed. This has been the result of the stronger influence of the crisis of the start of the 1980's on the economy of the majority of West European countries than on the U.S. economy; West Europe's increased dependence on the United States as a consequence of the deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the region; and the support by a number of NATO countries for the U.S. policy of confrontation, which has resulted in a weakening of the West European continent's role in international affairs.

The changes in the correlation of forces of the three centers, which are unfavorable for West Europe, were prepared to a considerable extent by Washington's aspiration to revenge in interimperialist relations and a limitation of West Europe's freedom of action, which had been manifested distinctly in the 1970's, that is, in the active period of detente, and to the restoration of its role as unquestioned leader of the "Western world".

The current situation, wherein the contradictions in all spheres of interimperialist mutual relations--policy, military affairs and, particularly, the economy--are intensifying and the West European countries' opportunities for compelling the transatlantic ally to heed their interests have diminished markedly, is being perceived painfully in West Europe's ruling circles.

Yu. Shishkov observed that in the current situation more favorable internal and external conditions for integration in the sphere of policy are taking shape compared with the 1960's-1970's. However, the more serious and unstable the economic situation and the more complex the political situation, the stronger is the aspiration to unification, but simultaneously so also the fears of each West European country that in a critical situation the community's bodies will be unable to defend its interests better than its own government and that the interests of individual countries could be sacrificed. Even now, while not a uniform political alliance, the EEC is a major economic and political force. It may be assumed that the course toward West Europe's independence and its liberation from the U.S. diktat will strengthen in the future.

Prof D. Melnikov, doctor of historical sciences, emphasized that the complete lifting of the restrictions on the West German Bundeswehr has changed the military-political status of the FRG. This has entailed a considerable strengthening of the country's military and economic-political positions in West Europe. The Bundeswehr has gained an opportunity to make far greater use than before of its huge military potential and consolidate its place as principal military force in the sphere of conventional arms. The fact that the restrictions were lifted via the Western European Union is of particular significance for it marks a strengthening of the "European prop" of the military-political grouping of Western countries.

Furthermore, mention has to be made of the strengthening of the Franco-West German "axis". The FRG and France have formed a close military-political, economic and technological alliance, which is becoming the nucleus of the West European community. Thanks to this alliance, the FRG is again presenting revanchist demands. The increase in revanchism in the country could have far-reaching consequences for the alignment of political and military-political forces in West Europe. All this together is contributing to the revival of the old plans for the creation within the framework of the EEC of a political community which would strive for a certain autonomy in relation to the United States.

K. Buterwegge concentrated attention on an analysis of the significance of the American space arms program for the development of mutual relations between the two centers of imperialist rivalry. An exacerbation of the contradictions between West Europe and the United States is connected with the so-called SDI for, as West European ruling circles believe, the possibility of the creation of a "space shield" will entail a weakening of West Europe's role for the United States and the "decoupling" of the security of the United States and West Europe. As the SDI is realized, the technology gap between the two centers could increase.

Efforts are being made in West Europe even now to surmount this technology gap, to which the elaboration of the French Eureka project testifies. Paris has proposed that the West European governments implement a joint program in the sphere of advanced technology which would compete to a certain extent with the U.S. program. Although the Eureka project emphasizes its civilian purpose, it has a manifestly military thrust and could stimulate the creation of a West European military-political grouping. This program is a step in the direction of West Europe's conversion into the "third space power".

J. Hufschmidt observed that in enlisting the West European allies in its space developments the U.S. Administration is endeavoring to shift a substantial proportion of the expenditure onto the other NATO participants and enlist West Europe's scientific achievements in the creation of a "space shield". Various contacts already exist between American and West European concerns engaged in space developments. The U.S. Administration is seeking an arrangement with West Europe at official level also, in order also that governments may finance the developments.

Supporters of association with the American program, in the FRG, for example, are attempting to persuade the public that a refusal to participate in the SDI will increase the technology gap between the United States and West Europe, from which the civilian sectors of the economy will incur losses, and that, on the other hand, participation in this R. Reagan program will make it possible to modernize all sectors. However, in practice the general economic consequences of this program could be catastrophically devastating. West Europe's consent to participate in the SDI will lead to the extensive militarization of R&D and the fact that scientific progress will be concentrated predominantly in narrowly specific sectors.

The speakers observed that the possibilities of detente are by no means exhausted. The West European states' objective interests require the development of cooperation with the socialist countries. This cooperation could help the West European states overcome the serious economic and political difficulties which they are encountering, while agreements with the Warsaw Pact countries on arms limitation could strengthen their security.

Summing up, Prof H. Jung, director of the Institute of Marxist Studies, FRG, Prof L. Meier, deputy director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics, GDR, and Prof V. Martynov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMEMO, noted the fruitful nature of the symposium, the comprehensive nature of the analysis of the situation in West Europe and the readiness for further study of problems which arise and an improvement in the methodology and procedure of scientific analysis.

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8850/9869

CSO: 1816/03

MEXICO IN 1985

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 99-104

[Article by I. Zorina: "Mexico, 1985..."]

[Text] On September days of 1985 Mexico was hit by a natural disaster of monstrous destructive power--such as happen once in a hundred years and more. On 19 September the country's capital, the biggest city in the developing world, whose population has approached 18 million, suffered an earthquake the force of which reached 8-9 points. Thousands of people found themselves under the ruins of buildings. The next day shocks of slightly less force recurred--and many structures which had survived the day before collapsed. According to a preliminary estimate, approximately 7,000 persons died, even more were injured and maimed and 150,000 lost their jobs. The business and tourist center of Mexico suffered the most, material losses are put at billions of dollars.... The catastrophe, which no one was expecting, was a reminder of how fragile remains the foundation of the civilization created by man even in our age of the greatest scientific achievements, how vulnerable a giant modern city is and how important and difficult it is to preserve what has been created by the labor of many generations.

The tragedy of Mexico pushed back for some time other troubles and daily concerns--and there are many of them in this country of, until recently, exceptionally dynamic development. The civic, human solidarity of the Mexicans and their courage, stanchness and dignity were displayed with remarkable strength in the face of the disaster. Tens of thousands of volunteers sorted out the obstructions and helped organize life in the city, which had in an instant been deprived of communications, water and electricity, and, it seemed, the whole country and the whole world held its breath: how many more lives would it be possible to dig out of the stone traps?

But as life in the country and the capital is beginning to resume its natural course, the difficult problems, which have been building up for a long time, are returning to the center of public attention, the social and political demarcation lines are being drawn once again, conflicts are flaring up.... These conflicts reached a certain culmination in the departing year. The year of 1985 has been marked not only by the earthquake. This has been a year of elections, which summed up the country's political development over a long period and reflected little by little the changes in the alignment of forces which had built up and the evolution of the political positions of the parties and classes of Mexican society.

The parliamentary and municipal elections were held in July 1985. Some 18 million of the 35 million registered voters went to the polls to decide who would occupy the seats in the lower house of parliament and the office of governor in 7 (out of 31) states and who would represent legislative authority in the states and municipalities.

Despite all their outward ordinariness, these elections were a kind of test of the strength of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has ruled unchanged since 1929, and the domestic and foreign policy orientation of its present leadership and, to a certain extent, of the entire Mexican political system.

I

For an understanding of the current internal political processes in Mexican society and an evaluation of the past elections it is essential to dwell if only briefly on the specific features and evolution of the country's political institutions.

The Mexican state, which grew out of the 1910-1917 bourgeois-democratic, anti-imperialist revolution, represents a unique phenomenon in Latin America. The most stable political system in the region has known no military coups for almost six decades now and maintains a continuity of policy both within the country and in the international arena. This system, although having undergone considerable evolution in recent decades, still responds on the "three pillars": "presidentialism"--strong and practically unlimited presidential power, the ideological-political hegemony in society of the ruling PRI, which encompasses a considerable proportion of the population,* and the ideology of "revolutionary nationalism". One of its postulates is the proposition concerning the "social pact" of the state and the people and the "historic alliance of the state with the unions," which took shape at the time of the radical transformations of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940).

The president, who is elected for a term of 6 years (without the right of reelection), is the sole, unbounded head of the executive authority and an actual legislator. Via the PRI machinery he practically forms the upper house of Congress--the Senate--and the Supreme Court and controls the entire ramified and well-adjusted party-state mechanism. It is with good reason that the Mexican president is sometimes called a "6-year emperor". "The president is omnipotent because behind him stand the Mexican people"--such is the official postulate. Indeed, his authority is unquestioned since it is based on the support of the entire party-state machinery. The president, the well-known Mexican political scientist A. Cordova once observed, long since ceased to be a personality, he has become a political institution.**

* The PRI incorporates with collective-member status almost all of the trade union centers and national sectorial trade unions, which constitute the "worker sector" of the party, the National Peasant Confederation--the "agrarian sector"--and organizations of small businessmen and tradesmen and youth, women's and other associations representing the "public sector". The big businessmen are incorporated with individual-member status.

** See A. Cordova, "La formacion del Poder politico en Mexico," Mexico City, 1972, p 57.

It is natural that the presidential election in the country is far more important than the parliamentary and municipal elections. The more so in that until recently the elections to parliament, the state legislatures and the municipalities more often than not amounted to a formal approval of candidates of the ruling party, which did not permit the competition of other political forces, confirmed in advance. For many years the PRI acted on the political stage practically alone, although various currents--right, left, centrist--embodying, as it were, a multiparty character within a single party organism, fought, coexisted and reached a uniform decision within it, as a rule, on the basis of consensus.

The 1977 political reform, which was brought about by the need to bring the political institutions into line with the changed socio-class structure, "opened" the Mexican political system, as it were, to new pretenders, if not to power, at least to participation therein. Although this reform did not call in question the PRI's hegemony in society, it facilitated the operations of opposition parties. Now any party, having declared the existence of 65,000 members and having collected no less than 1.5 percent of the vote, has a right to representation in the lower house of Congress.* The elections have thus become a test of the strength of various parties and currents, which has created certain inconveniences for the ruling party, which is not very well adapted to operating as a customary bourgeois party.

At the first post-reform elections to Congress in July 1979 the PRI lost 1 million votes. Some of them went to the coalition of the left organized by the Mexican Communist Party, which collected 700,000 votes (5.1 percent), others to the right, which had united around the conservative National Action Party (PAN, created in 1939), which had stirred from its lethargy.

At the 1982 presidential election the PRI candidate, Miguel de la Madrid, was, of course, beyond competition, collecting 74 percent of the vote. But even then a threat to the ruling party on the part of a consolidated right opposition, whose presidential candidate, P.E. Madero, who represented the powerful financial-industrial group of the northern state of Nuevo Leon called the Monterrey grouping, collected 16.4 percent of the vote, appeared.

It has been precisely from the right that the PRI has in recent years received the most tangible blows, at the local level, it is true. Thus at the elections to the municipal organs of administration in July 1983 the PAN candidates were victorious in a number of districts of the country's northern states. There was a real scandal the same year at the gubernatorial elections in the state of Sonora. There the unpopular candidate of the ruling party had manifestly lost to the united right, and the local authorities rigged the ballot to prevent the loss of the governorship. The press, particularly in the states bordering the United States, and clearly not without instigation from the North, rained down accusations on the government and the ruling party of "corruption, authoritarianism and incapacity for controlling the country" and of "the loss of moral support". There were quite enough grounds for such charges inasmuch as in the course of President M. de la Madrid's struggle

* In accordance with the reform, one-fourth of the deputies (100 out of 400) is now elected on the basis of proportional representation, the rest in accordance with the old, simple-majority system.

against corruption instances of the bribery of a number of top civil servants and police officials and their relations with organized crime and, particularly, with the ramified and all-powerful mafia of narcotics dealers had been uncovered.

In Mexico and, particularly zealously, in the United States there has come to be talk about "panism" (from the initials of the Spanish name of the National Action Party--PAN) and the rapid growth and organization of parties and currents of the right as a new phenomenon of Mexican political life. Under the conditions of the exacerbation of socioeconomic problems caused by the most severe financial and economic crisis, which has been experienced by the country since 1982, the huge foreign debt (\$98 billion) and also the policy of "strict austerity" which President M. de la Madrid is pursuing in accordance with IMF recommendations the right has begun to strike at many of the government's weak spots. It has demagogically arrayed itself here in the clothing of "defenders" of the ordinary Mexican, who bears all the burdens of the crisis, and the middle strata, which have suffered from the sharp surge of inflation. Speculating on the urgent need for the democratization of the traditional political system, the rightwing bourgeois parties and organizations, subsidized by the employers' confederations, are advocating the formation of a "civic society" opposed to the "authoritarian state".

The "Panists" have substantiated the need for the creation in the country of a "new majority" united around the PAN and capable of putting an end to the ruling party's "monopoly". They have increasingly often made use of the struggle methods of the forces of the left: taken to the streets and organized demonstrations, striving for a considerable mobilization of the population in the provincial centers.

Despite all its efforts to surround itself with the masses, the PAN nonetheless remains a party primarily of the big private capital mainly of the wealthy northern parts of the country closely connected with the U.S. economy and also of the middle strata. As if repairing omissions, big capital is attempting to eliminate the gap between its increased economic power and political representation in the system of power. "The businessmen themselves must determine where the country is going and not sit and wait, guessing which course for Mexico its government will choose," the representative of the national confederation of industrial and commerce chambers of Mexico declared at the start of 1985 at a discussion organized by the president of the government program for supplying the population with food and basic necessities.*

And big capital determined this "new" course, having proposed in its party's election program the revision of a number of articles of the constitution in order to limit state control in the economy and cut back the state sector, transferring some of its enterprises to private ownership, extend local capital's participation in the determination of economic policy and dissolve the "state-manipulated" unions; and eliminate the public sector (ejido holdings)

* See REPORTE DE COYUNTURA (Mexico City), No 10, 1985, p 6.

in agriculture. Inasmuch as the church, having recovered following many years of "silence" and now acting as a strong, well-organized institution of the defense of "traditional values," cooperates closely with the PAN, the "Panists" have included in their program a demand for the state system of tuition to be replaced by a church system and for the clergy to be accorded political rights.*

Great assistance is being rendered the groupings of the right in Mexico by the conservative wing of the United States' Republican Party. It was not fortuitous that its last convention in August 1984 in Dallas was attended by a PAN delegation. The local press has repeatedly exposed U.S. Ambassador J. Gavin's constant and scandalous contacts with businessmen, clergymen and rightwing political leaders.

Many Mexican observers believed on the eve of the elections, not without reason, that the Reagan administration would gamble mainly on the PAN. After all, in recent years it has been interfering increasingly assertively in the domestic political life of its southern neighbor. Of course, the White House had no interest in a destabilization of the Mexican political system, but it would like to have a more obliging government in Mexico. In addition, in feeding up the right and pushing it toward power, Washington is thereby putting constant pressure on the M. de la Madrid government, demanding from it concessions to foreign capital and, particularly, its abandonment of its independent and consistent policy in Central America. It was not fortuitous that the "Panists," whom the Americans have chosen as their spokesman, were particularly ferocious in their attacks on the foreign policy activity of the government, accusing it of conniving at the spread of "communism" in this region and demanding an end to cooperation with socialist Cuba and revolutionary Nicaragua.

The challenge which the PAN cast at the ruling party at the July 1985 elections amounted, on the pretext of limiting the PRI's "monopoly" of power, to a change in the country's domestic and foreign policy course and a turning of the controls of political leadership to the right, toward greater rapprochement with the United States. "Our time has come!"--such was the frame of mind of the right. PAN Chairman P.E. Madero arrogantly declared in the course of the election campaign that now, for the first time in the country's history, his party could win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. While the gubernatorial candidate in the state of Sonora, which became a kind of proving ground for perfecting methods of squeezing the PRI from the commanding positions and creating a two-party model along American lines, A. Rosas, leader of the agricultural employers, plainly declared, having built up, as it were, a militantly aggressive charge of reaction: "My victory will be the start of the defeat of the PRI and its loss in the future of the presidency."**

* In accordance with the 1917 Constitution, the church in Mexico was separated from the state and deprived of the right to land and real estate. The clergy is prohibited from taking part in political life and controlling education.

** NEWSWEEK, 8 July 1985, pp 21-22.

However, the turn to the right at the elections, which many people had expected, did not occur. Although its electorate declined somewhat, the PRI nonetheless gained a convincing victory, obtaining 65 percent of the vote (compared with 69.2 percent in 1982). It once again won all the governorships, 292 seats in the Congress (299 in 1982) and the overwhelming majority of positions in the local organs of power. Despite all the aggressive vigor of its election campaign and the assistance of the North American neighbor, the PAN lost some voters (16.7 percent voted for it compared with 17.5 percent in 1982), and its representation in the Congress declined, it acquiring only 38 seats (compared with 55 in 1982). Two other small parties--the Mexican Democratic Party (right) and the True Mexican Revolution Party, which had split from the PRI--strengthened their positions somewhat, garnering 2.9 and 2.4 percent of the vote respectively (compared with 2.2. and 1.3 percent in 1982). But as a whole the offensive of the right was contained. "The elections showed once again," Minister of the Interior (sic) M. Bartlett, who headed the Federal Election Commission, declared, clearly answering his North American opponents, "that Mexico is an independent country and can do without orders from abroad."

Considerable credit in the repulse of reaction is due the forces of the left, which in the course of the election campaign, while criticizing the policy of the ruling party, simultaneously explained to the electorate what kind of a threat to the people's democratic gains and the country's independence was represented by the reactionaries--the "Panists". Although they did not overcome the organizational fragmentation and internecine rivalry which weakened them, the parties and currents of the left nonetheless operated in the elections with a uniform platform. It had been signed at the start of 1985 by the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM),* the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), the Mexican Workers Party (PMT) and the political associations Left Communist Unity and Socialist Current, which do not as yet have the status of officially registered parties.

The uniform program of the left contained a number of demands in defense of the working people's socioeconomic rights, particularly an increase in wages and the introduction of a sliding scale thereof, a 40-hour work week and an improvement in the pension system. It proposed a program of the democratization of political and social life, including the broadening of the Congress' legislative functions, the establishment of elective bodies of municipal self-government in the capital and the Federal District, a change in election law, introduction of the principle of proportional representation in all organs of state power and permission for the political parties to create election coalitions and supervise the holding of elections.

Together with this the program expressed support in principle by the forces of the left for the foreign policy line of the government of President M. de la Madrid and his firm policy of a peaceful political solution of the Central

* The Unified Socialist Party of Mexico was created in November 1981 as a result of the merger of the Mexican Communist Party, Mexican People's Party, the Socialist Unity and Action Movement, the Revolutionary Socialist Party and the United Popular Action Movement.

American crisis and important initiatives in the sphere of disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and the preservation of peace.

Although the forces of the left in Mexico have scored certain successes in recent years in the creation of a press and the strengthening of influence, the new democratic trade unions, peasant organizations and universities included, they are still disconnected and do not have a serious chance of changing the political situation in the country. The results of the elections, at which the PSUM obtained 3.5 percent (compared with 4.4 percent in 1982), the PMT 2.6 percent (compared with 1.9 percent) and the PMT 1.7 percent (did not participate in the 1982 elections), testify to this. As a whole, the left gained 29 seats, enlarging their representation in the Congress somewhat (27 seats in 1982). They succeeded to a large extent in preventing a mass migration to the right of those dissatisfied with government policy. But they did not succeed--and this had been declared to be a principal task of the left struggle--in overcoming the passiveness of the population and the side the disillusioned who did not take part in the elections. And this group currently constitute in Mexico almost half of the electorate--17 million out of 35 million.

The ruling party operated under the slogan of "revolutionary opportunities," the creation of a "society of equal opportunity" and "democracy of participation" and moral renewal, the eradication of corruption and development with a growth of employment and the removal of social contrasts. The party leadership is attempting to overcome the crisis phenomena which have arisen therein. The old ideological apparatus, which has not updated the party rhetoric for a long time and has not changed the methods of dealing with the masses, has in recent years found itself increasingly less effective, especially under the conditions of economic crisis.

Of course, the ideology of "revolutionary nationalism" and the active involvement in the common goal defined by the PRI leadership as the building of a society on the principles of "social justice" are still rooted in the minds of many Mexicans. However, it is becoming increasingly incoherent, and even political scientists are speaking about this, that the party today lacks dynamism and that "revolutionary nationalism" itself which is inscribed on its banners. Populism, which for many years nurtured the institution of "presidentialism" and other political structures, is drying up also. The threat of a split in the party and a departure therefrom of the supporters of social reformism has arisen even. As yet they have managed to insist on the policy of "renewal" approved by the PRI National Assembly at the start of 1984. But the pace of this "renewal" is not to the liking of many people.

Coming to head the country at the end of 1982 (the peak of the crisis), President M. de la Madrid began the pursuit of a policy of strict economy and combating inflation and unemployment and corruption in the civil service. The set of measures for economic recovery--a sharp reduction in imports, reduction in spending, a lowering of the subsidies on food and utilities and a reduction in government expenditure--made it possible to halt the growth of inflation somewhat (from 97 percent in 1982 to 50 percent in 1984) and reduce the budget deficit (from 18.5 percent to 10.5 percent respectively). The rate of growth of the foreign debt slowed. As a result,

difficult negotiations with foreign creditors there was in September 1984 a reorienting of the foreign debt in the direction of long-term credit and certain privileges in respect of repayment thereof. Encouraging the private sector as the "main factor of the country's economic revival,"* the government sought a marked stimulation thereof. In 1984 private capital investments increased 8.8 percent, whereas a decline therein had been observed in the preceding 2 years. There are signs of economic recovery: the increase in the gross domestic product in 1984 constituted 3.5 percent (compared with the zero increase in 1983).

However, it is evidently still too early to speak of a long-term economic upturn. After all, in the 2 crisis years (1982-1983) the gross domestic product fell by 5.8 percent and per capita 11 percent. The upturn which is being experienced is as yet confined merely to certain sectors. The need to meet the high interest on state loans has already forced the government to embark on the dangerous path of the extensive development of oil production, to which it is being urged to a considerable extent by the United States, which covers one-fourth of its liquid fuel requirements by Mexican oil.

And, what is particularly dangerous, the social situation in the country will hardly improve in the next few years. After all, the rapid economic growth which had been observed in Mexico for more than 30 years increased the discrepancy of social development in the 1950's-1970's. There was a marked increase in income, mainly of the highest and middle strata, while a considerable proportion of the population, rural particularly, was making limited demands on the market. The high concentration of income predetermined the deformation of the structure of consumption: the prosperous strata determined for a certain time increased demand for consumer durables, whereas the production of basic necessities for the broad masses developed slowly and required state subsidies. The 1982 crisis unexpectedly and painfully interrupted Mexico's seemingly very lively dynamic advance along the path of modernization based on the accelerated development of manufacturing and oil industry and the expansion of commerce. State subsidies were cut back sharply, and, naturally, it was the workers, petty employees and urban masses, who were deprived of comparatively cheap products and utilities, who suffered most from the crisis, inflation and the closing of a number of enterprises.

Real wages fell in the crisis years: 25.3 percent in 1983 and a further 20 percent in 1984. According to the estimate of the trade unions, wages had to have increased 130 percent for the restoration of the workers' purchasing power, but they grew in the crisis years approximately only 30 percent annually.** Mexicans' sharp dissatisfaction was caused by the increase in wages as of 1 June 1985 of only 18 percent, given a growth in the cost of living in the first 4 months of the year of 65 percent. Unemployment is not being absorbed in practice. In 1984 it remained at the 16-percent level. The number of new jobs increased only 1.6 percent in 1984 and will increase 2.3 percent (estimated) in 1985, whereas the annual rate of growth of manpower constituted 3.8 percent.

* At the start of 1985 the government announced the sale to private ownership of 236 or 900 state companies.

** *El Financiero*, Mexico City, March-April 1985, p. 4.

It is increasingly difficult for the government and the official trade unions to preserve "social peace" in the country and continue the offensive on the labor front. The biggest trade union association--the Confederation of Mexican Workers (5 million members)--which since 1936 has constituted the basis of the "worker sector" of the ruling party, and its permanent secretary, Fidel Velasquez, of the same age as the century and who has already lived through seven presidents, still ensure for the government control over the workers movement, helping put an end to critical situations. But official syndicalism also is experiencing crisis phenomena, encountering the increasing pressure of the worker masses, which are demanding resolute defense of their interests, and also the growing independent unions. It is with good reason that acute disagreements have arisen recently within the government and the PRI leadership precisely on questions of social policy in respect of the working class.

Social tension is growing in the countryside also, where the ruling party traditionally has strong support among the peasants, who acquired land from the government. Combining the manipulation of the downtrodden masses with the repression of peasant activists, the rural (kassiki) (community elders) are still holding rural poverty in check. But protests against hunger and the delays in the implementation of agrarian reform are already growing. Huge peasant marches on the capital and the presidential palace were organized in April 1984 and 1985.

Simultaneously the ruling party and the government are experiencing increasingly great pressure on the part of the middle strata, which strengthened in the economic boom years and which are now pretending to power, and also the consolidated haute bourgeoisie. The government has already made concessions to them, having defined the principles of a new "social pact" for the long term, in which, as the Mexican communists believe, the role of the employer organizations has increased and the unions have been squeezed. At the start of 1984 the party leadership adopted a suggestion of the governors of the most developed northern states for the creation in the PRI of a "fourth sector," which would represent private businessmen in order to "naturalize the private sector's participation in the official party". The government is hereby attempting to incorporate part of the bourgeois opposition in the PRI in order to channel and control its increased political assertiveness.

III

The Mexican political system has succeeded on the whole in amortizing the blows struck at it by the economic crisis and the exacerbated social problems, maintaining continuity of the political course and throwing back the offensive of reaction, that is, confirming its viability.

In what direction, however, will the country's political system be transformed? While in Mexico, precisely on the eve of the elections, I put this question to political scientists in the research centers in which I worked. At least three possible prospects emerged from the answers I obtained.

Many people, particularly in the leftwing university environment, are inclined to believe that under the conditions of the continuing crisis phenomena, the policy of "strict austerity," which will evidently be extended several years,

and the "authoritarian" model of economic development supported by the present administration the Mexican political system will become more authoritarian, undemocratic and closed. Big capital and the middle strata will acquire in the new concentration of power within the ruling party greater rights, whereas in regard to the bulk of the population the government, limited in its room for social maneuvering, will move toward a tightening of conditions. Others consider most likely development in the direction of the creation of a two-party system according to the American model if the PAN is able in the future to limit the PRI's predominant role in the country's political life. Nor is the scenario of a transformation of the Mexican political system into a military system as a result of the split of the ruling party and the strengthening of other opposition parties and currents precluded. Finally, some specialists, referring to the specific features of the formation of social and political structures in Mexico which took shape on the revolutionary wave of 1917, do not rule out the fact that the government and the ruling party could again resort to a mobilization of the masses in the traditions of L. Cardenas under the slogan of "revolutionary nationalism" and the demand of national sovereignty.

One could think would prove to be today's insoluble problem -- the foreign debt, in connection with which Latin American countries' integrationist actions are being stimulated at present. Together with other Latin American states Mexico is seeking a revision of the terms of repayment of the debt, a 50-60-year extension of the debt-repayment term and a cancellation of additional interest on the loans. Mexico's National Board of Foreigners recently advocated the creation of a united front with other debt-countries in order to attain a "reasonable" proportion of external income in payment of the debt and not allow the states' economic spending.

The Mexican administration, which is accustomed to common methods in international affairs, would very much like to raise the status of the Mexican power and harness it to the system of its policies. But Mexico, despite the tremendous financial and economic dependence on the United States (American markets take 70 percent of Mexican exports, and U.S. banks and financial institutions account for 80 percent of its foreign debt), is consistently maintaining its national sovereignty and opposing in the international arena all forms of foreign interference.

Mexico has never in its foreign policy renounced its right and duty, as a sovereign state, to preserve independence from the power of North America in relations in defense questions. Following WWI practically all Latin American countries concluded treaties with the United States by according, with which they were presented with military equipment in exchange, and according to which the right to create bases on their territories and send in the military and military advisors. Only Mexico refused to conclude such a treaty on consented grounds: the principle of military equipment for cash or on credit, but on such occasion at its own initiative.

In 40 past years (1950-1990) Mexico did not receive the arms either within the framework of the American program for military assistance to Latin American countries or via other channels. An agent state, taking economic, political

and moral and not military factors remained the general direction in the country's international policy.

The Mexican Government maintains relations of cooperation with Cuba and Nicaragua, respecting the right of the peoples of these countries to proceed along their chosen path of social development. Despite its own grim financial situation and the growing pressure from the North, it confirmed in May 1985 that it would continue oil supplies to Nicaragua.

Mexico is an active participant in the Contadora Group, which proposed the "Act of Peace"--a diplomatic solution of the regional conflict--which was drawn up as a result of complex negotiations lasting 2 years with all the Central American countries. This country, which "defends" the border of all Latin America, operates by consistently peaceful means, upholding its national dignity, which is so characteristic of every Mexican. The United States is unwilling to reconcile itself to its growing role in the Central America and Caribbean region. Also clearly irritating Washington is Mexico's active position on questions of disarmament and the creation of nuclear-free zones, the reorganization of international economic relations and the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid and its growing prestige in the United Nations and other international organizations. While preserving its observer status in the nonaligned movement Mexico speaks out actively on urgent socioeconomic issues of the developing countries and global problems. Its signature is appended to the Delhi Declaration of the leaders of six nonnuclear countries (India, Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden), who presented in January 1985 an initiative in the sphere of disarmament, prevention of an arms race in space and the conclusion of a treaty which would completely prohibit nuclear tests.

Mexico is building its relations with the Soviet Union on the firm foundation of a policy of peaceful coexistence, practical trade-economic partnership and cooperation in the solution of most important international problems. These relations acquired a firm treaty basis at the end of the 1960's and, particularly, in the 1970's. The agreement on scientific-technical cooperation signed in October 1975 in Moscow, which gave life to the mixed Soviet-Mexican commission, is being realized successfully. "Relations between Mexico and the USSR, which are based on mutual respect and mutual understanding," President M. de la Madrid observed, "have already stood the test of time and will undoubtedly strengthen even more in the future."

Mexico is today confronted by difficult tasks—not only of restoring the capital, which was devastated by the earthquake, but also of finding a way out of the socio-economic crisis, solving the foreign debt problem and completing the modernization of the economy, including industrialization and the creation of new industrial sectors competitive on the world market, which would appear particularly difficult under the conditions of the structural reorganization which is under way in the developed capitalist countries. The tasks of social modernization and the strengthening of Mexican society and the democratization of its political system under the conditions of the growth of the working people's struggle and its combination with the political system remain no less complex.

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BOOK ON SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL REVOLUTION, WORLD ECONOMY REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 136-137

[L. Nochevkina, L. Presnyakova review: "The Scientific-Technical Revolution and the Worldwide Economy"]

[Text] Collating the experience of many countries and regions of the world, the author of the book in question* investigates the new stage of the scientific-technical revolution in the light of the world economy and the evolved international division of labor. Such a global approach enabled him to illustrate in a new way the most important singularities of contemporary technical-economic and social processes.

Many of the problems which are currently being discussed extensively are illustrated in an original way in the book. One of them is the dialectic of the interaction of the scientific-technical revolution and the intensification of production. The book advances the proposition that scientific-technical progress realized under the conditions of relatively surplus fuel-energy, raw material and labor resources did not contribute to the surmounting of predominantly extensive growth. Realization of the latest achievements in some sectors was accompanied by an expansion of the use of extensive factors in others (growth of the social product's energy consumption, increase in those employed in assembly operations and so forth). Partial refinements of traditional techniques led as a result to the formation of a resource-squandering model of economic development, which created resource and ecological limitations on the scale of the world economy. The narrowing of the sources of extensive growth has, as the book shows, brought about the need for transition to a type of intensive development which is characterized by the mass fundamental renewal of technology and the accelerated replacement not only of the obsolete but also obsolescent production apparatus.

While fully supporting the justice and importance of these conclusions I would however like to mention that the author puts the emphasis on resource

* Yu.S. Shirvayev, "Mirovoye khozyaystvo: novyye tekhnologicheskiye i sotsialno-ekonomicheskiye faktory razvitiya" [The World Economy: New Technological and Socioeconomic Factors of Development], Ex. ed. V.I. Anchishkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Nauka", 1984, p 232.

Within the framework of the new industrial revolution the problem of employment is becoming a global problem of the world capitalist economy. The measures being adopted in individual Western countries to regulate employment are proving bankrupt inasmuch as under the conditions of the present-day capitalist international division of labor a country which has raised the level of employment at home inevitably "exports" unemployment to other countries via the channels of affiliated TNC systems and even customary commodity exports. In the future these problems will become even more acute.

The fundamentally different socioeconomic consequences of the modern technological revolution under socialism emphasize for the umpteenth time that the similarity of technical solutions is no reason for technological determinism. This can be seen particularly distinctly upon an investigation of the two types of international division of labor--capitalist and socialist.

Capitalism cannot claim a monopoly in the sphere of scientific-technical progress. The acceleration of the scientific-technical revolution and the consistent intensification of production are at the center of the attention of the economic policy of each socialist country. Major potential is contained in the development of the socialist countries' international economic cooperation. Realization of the strategy of the socialist international division of labor for the 1980's-1990's will require the practical implementation of a system of interconnected measures both within the framework of individual countries and in the system of control of international economic cooperation. These measures concern primarily cooperation in the sphere of planning activity, development of the reciprocal trade market and an improvement in its commodity-money instruments, a rapprochement of the structures of the national economic mechanisms and a strengthening of the organizational-legal principles of CEMA's activity.

The author has made an interesting attempt to study the impact of the scientific-technical revolution on a change in the specific forms of the international division of labor and the quest for new forms of the socialist countries' international cooperation. It is a question of such a phenomenon as the "progressive intellectualization of exchange," which has been manifested not only in the form of the direct growth of the trade in patents, licenses and know-how but also in the change in the nature of a number of forms of international economic relations materialized in components or finished products. Among these the author distinguishes scientific-technical production cooperation, the development of construction-installation services and specialized reconstruction and equipment modernization services and other forms.

Granted all the wealth of factual content concerning the technical revolution in the world, the work could evidently have revealed more fully the general and the specific in the structural reorganization occurring under the conditions of the two world systems and compared their initial levels and anticipated results.

But this approach does not detract from the overall evaluation of the book in question, which we regard as outstanding. It will undoubtedly be of great interest to specialists and attract the attention of a wide range of readers interested in current problems of the worldwide economy, socialist economic integration and scientific-technical progress.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 138-140

[V. Kudrov review: "Economic Efficiency Under Capitalist Conditions"]

[Text] The work in question* studies the influence on labor productivity of such factors as the accumulation of fixed capital, the capital-worker ratio, scientific-technical progress, production concentration and specialization, reproduction proportions, the scientific-educational complex, the management system at firm level and economic expenditure. By productivity the authors mean the productivity of live labor. Despite the fact that the book not only mentions but also analyzes the method of production function (pp 24-27, chapter IV), the concept of the productivity of all labor (both live and embodied) has remained beyond the framework of this study. However, this problem essentially requires special study. It is well known that the productivity of live labor constitutes merely one component of production efficiency. The latter is, however, best characterized by the productivity of all labor--live and embodied. As far as the influence of accumulation on productivity is concerned, the authors rightly believe that it is exerted by both material and nonmaterial accumulation (p 294) and, particularly, a country's scientific-educational potential.

The monograph begins with a chapter which thoroughly examines theoretical questions of the accumulation of fixed capital as a general condition of a rise in the productive force of labor, shows the dynamics of accumulation and labor productivity and analyzes individual factors of its growth, structures of the accumulation of fixed capital and the singularities of this process in the 1970's. The study is distinguished by breadth of approach and a specific characterization of the structural changes in the composition of fixed capital, primarily thanks to its saturation with instruments and electronics. Modern electronic equipment serves as the basis not only of the creation of many new so-called high-tech traditional sectors but also of the qualitative transformation of the old, traditional sectors, where the production capacities are being increased with the help of computers without its fundamental reconstruction, in a short time and given comparatively low capital investments (p 47).

Attention is called in this connection to the analysis of the evolutionary and revolutionary forms of technical transformations and the conclusion which is drawn concerning the existence of a number of advantages on the side of the

* "Sovremennyy kapitalizm: nakopleniye i proizvoditelnyy trud" [Contemporary Capitalism: Accumulation and Labor Productivity], Ed. ed. S.M. Nikitin, Institute of Economic Sciences, Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Nauka", 1984, p. 302.

evolutionary type connected with the continuous, at times almost imperceptible refinement of existing equipment and technology. These advantages are conditioned by the rapid recovery of expenditure, the lack of demands for a high concentration of resources and, consequently, mass character and accessibility for small and medium producers and less of a breakup of the evolved production apparatus. The significance of the evolutionary type of technical transformations increases as the level of equipment provision, maturity and balanced nature of the economy rises, when it is not so much the accumulation fund as the fixed capital compensation fund which becomes the source of financing of these transformations.

The conclusion concerning the reduction in the capital-output ratio in all the main capitalist countries in question also appears important. It should be emphasized, however, that this trend has in recent years been connected to a decisive extent with the extensive reorganization of their production apparatus geared to the use of energy-saving equipment and technology and the implementation of diverse nature-conservation measures. Consequently, it is not of an irreversible nature. Furthermore, in the United States, if we take not the economy as a whole but only the material production sphere, the capital-output ratio has not declined but grown (p. 34).

It has at the same time to be noted, however, that the chapter does not provide a precise definition of fixed capital. It remains unclear whether the cost of roads, accommodation and so forth is included in the value of the latter. The absence of an analysis of the engineering and reproduction structures of fixed capital and its accumulation also contributes to this uncertainty.

The second chapter analyzes the trends of the changes in the labor-intensiveness, capital-worker ratio and capital-intensiveness of production in the main sectors of U.S. manufacturing industry, shows the growth therein of the provision of production with equipment and presents a quite extensive and specific picture of scientific-technical progress. An original grouping of manufacturing industry sectors with the separation of sectors of continuous, semicontinuous and discrete processes is suggested and the normality of the gradual decline in the labor productivity growth rate upon the transition from the first to subsequent groups is ascertained here.

Besides the singularities of the technical-technological conditions of production, an appreciable influence on productivity is exerted by the growth of the capital-worker ratio and scientific-technical progress. The growth of labor productivity in the sectors of U.S. manufacturing industry (from a total of 1.4 to 5.6 in the postwar period) is a result of the increase in the provision of production with equipment, which in recent years has been expressed primarily in its electrification. The material basis of this process is the rapid growth of the production and spread of diverse computing equipment, including electronic components of micro- and mini-computers. The tremendous merit of this modern equipment lies in the all-purpose nature of its use, reliability and economical nature (cheapness) making it possible, first, to enhance technical-economic parameters and the productivity of both new and old, long-functioning equipment and, second, to reduce the costs of production and, consequently, increase the profit norm and its overall efficiency.

The extensive use of computers, microprocessors and other new electronic equipment and the provision of many well-known types of machinery and equipment with electronic components make it possible to increase labor productivity from 3-fold to 30-fold (p 83). At the same time the resources of modern scientific-technical progress in the United States have proven to be underused, which the rise in capital-intensiveness and the high level of underload of production capacity in the majority of industrial sectors indicate. As a whole, according to the adduced calculations, the capital-intensiveness of the product of U.S. manufacturing industry grew 3 percent from 1950 through 1980 (p 73).

The analysis of the dynamics of the provision of individual sectors of American industry, engineering particularly, with equipment would seem very valuable. A characteristic feature of its postwar development "has been the intensification of the use of the sector's entire production apparatus and the machine pool particularly. In the period 1950-1983 the product output per unit of equipment in the machine pool increased by a factor of 3.6, and the average annual rate of increase therein in the said period as a whole constituted almost 4 percent" (p 115). The genesis of the production and spread in the United States of machine tools with numerical programmed control is examined particularly thoroughly. The thoughts expressed concerning definition of the technical level of production concept are valuable and interesting (p 124).

However, we cannot agree with all the author's propositions in the second chapter. Thus, in his opinion, the proportion of engineering in the structure of the production of U.S. manufacturing industry is rising (p 111), although it is well known that it has been declining since the end of the 1960's based on the growing intensification of the use of resources.

The third chapter of the monograph is devoted to such a considerable factor of labor productivity growth as production concentration and specialization. Of fundamental importance is the conclusion contained therein concerning the process which had begun in American industry of the deconcentration of production and the reduction in the optimum size of enterprises. As a result "economies in the diversity" of products and production specialization typical of small and medium-sized firms have begun to surpass the "economies in the scale" of production characteristic of the big firms. The authors' investigations showed that as of the mid-1960's "a general trend toward the stability of or even a reduction in the optimum size of enterprises has been manifested" (p 146) in U.S. industry. Small and medium-sized firms are often the exponents and initiators of scientific-technical progress, and it is only subsequently that the big companies embark on mass production. The cooperation of the big and small firms ultimately takes shape on the basis of the corresponding division of labor.

A few observations on the third chapter. The term "size structure" denoting the share of a group of firms in production according to the characteristics of their size seems to us unsuccessful. The term "concentration process," which is encountered in literature frequently, is just as unsuccessful.

Further, we can hardly agree with the proposition that innovations are a special area of scientific-technical progress (p 148): innovations evidently constitute the deep-living essence of the latter. And, further still: the chapter speaks of the export sector and export branches of the American economy (pp 165, 167). The export quota embraces in the United States a wide diversity of sectors and processes, and, it seems to us, there are simply no specialized export sectors there.

The remaining chapters of the book investigate problems of the impact on labor productivity of such factors as reproduction proportions, the scientific-educational complex and the system of the organization of management; a special chapter is devoted to indicators of potential output and labor productivity.

The work examines the parallel growth of the two subdivisions of social production in the U.S. economy, which has exerted a stimulating influence not only on labor productivity but also on the creation of a sectorial and production structure which is characterized by great flexibility and adaptability to changing reproduction conditions (p 176). The proportion of intensive factors in an increase in the product of the second subdivision is higher here than the first (35-30 percent). The production function method employed in the fourth chapter showed that in the overall increase in labor productivity in the national economy the proportion of intensive factors constituted 81 percent and of extensive factors 19 percent (p 184).

The role of science and education in ensuring the growth of the productivity and standard of labor is great. The ever increasing expenditure at research in these spheres produces a positive result. The diverse practice in respect of an improvement in management in the corporations also produces first of all a real result. The authors reveal a trend toward its increased decentralization.

The monograph, which is rich with interpretive problems of measurement of the potential social product, potential income and the real one, seems somewhat apart. The author frequently loses himself in an examination of factors of income here without reason, as was the case in preceding chapters, the connection with living standards. In addition, the result of the calculations, which show that the growth of actual output was appreciably ahead of the growth of potential output (p 184), is puzzling.

Despite certain shortcomings, the monograph is nevertheless a valuable study, especially with regard to the analysis of the problems of labor productivity.

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V.F. LI BOOK ON SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN ASIA, AFRICA REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 145-146

[V. Lukin review: "The Noncapitalist Path--Achievements and Difficulties"]

[Text] Among the many works published in our country devoted to an analysis of various aspects of the problems of the developing world the book in question* will undoubtedly find a fitting place. Confidence in this is reinforced by two distinctive features of the work.

First, it represents profound and integral scientific, theoretical reflection based on a thorough collation of the experience of the noncapitalist development path of a number of developing states throughout several recent decades. It is not just further evidence of ongoing phenomena but a serious comprehension and interpretation thereof based on Marxist-Leninist methodology. "Style" has been enlisted only to the extent that it makes it possible to illustrate the propositions advanced by the author.

Second, the book is distinguished by realism and soberness and objectiveness of opinion. It clearly draws the line between "what should be" and "what is," between what one would like or expect to see at the start of the movement of a number of Asian and African states along a noncapitalist path and the processes which have occurred and which continue to occur there in reality. It is not fortuitous that the book's subtitle reads: "Problems and Contradictions of Noncapitalist Transitional Development".

A most important singularity of the book is the interesting attempt made by the author to provide a summary picture of the political system which has evolved in societies of the transitional period. Relying on the studies of Soviet philosophers and orientalists of the 1970's-start of the 1980's, he concludes that the transitional-type state "in countries of noncapitalist development may in terms of its class essence be of either a national-democratic or revolutionary-democratic nature" (p 38). Certain class conditions at the helm of government correspond to each such type of state. And these types may have numerous political forms: a dictatorship of military-revolutionary forces, a presidential republic, one-party or multiparty rule and a unitary, federative setup or frequently a contradictory combination of the said forms. V. Li emphasizes that certain traditional forms of political organization may be suffused under the conditions of state-

* V.F. Li, "Sotsialnaya revolyutsiya i vlast v stranakh Vostoka" [Social Revolution and Power in Countries of the East], Moscow, Glavnyy nauchno-issledovatel'skiy literaturny izdatel'stva "Nauka", 1984, p 288.

of the transitional type with fundamentally new content. Thus temporary military-revolutionary power in a number of countries of noncapitalist development is fundamentally different from military-democratic power in traditional societies.

For the first time in our literature the monograph examines in detail the principle of one-party rule in a transitional-type state officially enshrined in program documents of the ruling revolutionary parties and in the permanent and provisional constitutions of the PDRY, Ethiopia, Angola and a number of other countries. The author believes that the one-party political structure becomes an effective superstructural tool of a deepening of the revolutionary process given the existence of a number of conditions. Primarily if it is a question of a regular revolutionary workers party struggling to advance toward a socialist future. Such a party should unite in its ranks all the sociopolitical forces and movements interested in the creation of a society which will be devoid of man's exploitation of man. If the social basis of antagonistic contradictions between different classes and strata is narrowing appreciably. Finally, if the one-party political structure is based on the principles of democracy, extensive popular initiative and constant and effective control on the part of the broad working people's masses, particularly of the working class which is taking shape and the poorest peasantry.

"Given the absence of just one of the above-listed conditions," the book emphasizes, "the imposition of a one-party system by decree, despite certain temporary positive results, could impede the democratization of social-political development and hinder the deepening of the revolutionary process" (pp 39-40).

Taking as a basis the practice of the development of the revolutionary process in the developing countries, the author concludes that "the one-party approach under the conditions of noncapitalist development cannot be seen as a universal version of the struggle for the building of a new society" (p 40). As proof of the accuracy of this generalization he refers to the experience of the search for a multiparty version in a number of Asian and African countries which have opted for a noncapitalist path.

Showing the distinctiveness of the different types of political organization of the countries of noncapitalist development, V. Li rightly connects this with the singularities of the social structure of the developing society. And the central place here is devoted to an analysis of the nonproletarian workers strata. The scholar shows how flexibly and tenaciously precapitalist structures and their exponents adapt to the economic and social transformations occurring in the society of the type in question. Whence the important conclusion: "The traditional precapitalist structure is undoubtedly a broader socioeconomic category than the subsistence-patriarchal structure" (p 65). And this means that certain social strata, formally cast beyond the framework of this structure, essentially remain exponents of traditional forms of social life and consciousness. Such a composition makes readily intelligible "sociological transplants" in the political sphere with reference to the developing countries very dangerous for the "modernist" surface often conceals merely lightly camouflaged remnants of the old relations etc. as the author

calls them, "neotraditionalist" relations. All this conditions the "extraordinarily stretched transitional aspect in the formation of a new basis, new social structure and new superstructure," which "constitutes the main feature of the noncapitalist development path" (p 75).

The book in question reveals to the reader a complex, contradictory picture full of acute collisions and tension. Very appropriately, the brief conclusion quotes Victor Hugo's words to the effect that "state power, if it loses the capacity for making adroit use of it, may lead the ruling groups to degradation." There are, unfortunately, many examples of such degradation shortly following a vicarious and complex "start" in the relatively short historical interlude of the existence of states of a noncapitalist path. Closing our eyes to this would mean turning aside from a historical and historical analysis of the phenomenon in question. "However," V. Lioukov, "the revolutionary-liberation movement in the 1970's 'grouped its way toward' effective ways to break this closed circle of petty bourgeois political consciousness. The transition of the revolutionary vanguard forces of Asian and African countries to the positions of the ideology of the working class, the positions of scientific socialism, constitutes the basis thereof. Such a transition increases many times over the revolutionary potentialities of a society of noncapitalist development and the prospects of its subsequent transition to real socialism" (p 363).

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BOOK ON EXPANDING ROLE OF EEC REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 85 (signed to press 16 Oct 85) pp 149-150

[K. Zuyeva, D. Tomashevskiy review: "'Little Europe' and International Relations"]

[Text] Under the conditions of the present sharp exacerbation through the fault of the United States of Soviet-American relations and the increased threat of war particular urgency is attached to study of the role and potential in world politics of the EEC, which now numbers 12 countries. To this extent or the other problems of West European integration have been touched on in the studies of many Soviet authors. A definite contribution to the development of these problems is also made by V. Kniajinski's work "West European Integration: Policy and International Relations,"* which thoroughly examines the political aspect of the formation and development of "Little Europe".

The book shows convincingly that the integration of the six West European states, even within the narrow framework of the customs union (not to mention the earlier attempts at an association of a military-political persuasion), reflected not only the objective trends of the development of the production forces but also the long-term class interests of the West European bourgeoisie, primarily in the confrontation with world socialism and the national liberation movements. Nor was it fortuitous that the United States, while not closing its eyes to the prospect of a strengthening of the economic positions of its West European competitors united in the Common Market, nonetheless supported the policy of the deepening and expansion of integration. "History teaches us that in the specific situation of the mid-1950's," the author observes, "the activity of the capitalist states, which largely determined the development of the integration process, was dictated primarily by class and political motives" (pp 117-118).

The defenders of integration presented the creation of the Common Market as a panacea capable of ensuring the solution of the most acute political and

* V. Kniajinski. "L'Integration ouest-europeenne: politique et relations internationales," Editions du Progres, Moscou, 1984, p 460.

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socioeconomic problems of capitalism. However, the 25-year-plus experience of the activity of the EEC has, as the book shows, dispelled the myths concerning the onset of an era of "prosperity" and the reformist illusions of "social peace".

Examining in detail the political mechanism of the community and the role of the integration institutions, the author notes that the expansion of the framework of the EEC and, particularly, Britain's association with the European Community have been marked by an increased trend toward the cooperation of the countries incorporated therein in the foreign policy sphere. The practice of such cooperation has been "an important stage of the development of the political mechanism of European integration" (p 258). At the same time the capitalist nature of the West European integration grouping not only does not preclude but directly presupposes differences, very considerable at times, both in an understanding of common interests and goals and in the determination of the ways to realize them, not to mention sharp contradictions on specific issues. And this is perfectly natural: in participating in the integration process the bourgeoisie of each country is pursuing not only common class goals but also its own goals, which may be achieved "frequently to the detriment of the interests of the partners" (p 304). As a result, together with centripetal trends, the development of the European Community is also characterized by centrifugal trends impeding the integration process. However, the first, as the facts show, conditioned by long-term common class interests, will ultimately gain the ascendancy over the second, which are connected more with transitory circumstances.

Despite the manifest failure of the attempts to fully integrate the foreign policy of the community members, it may be acknowledged that it acts in practice in the international arena, at least in certain spheres, as a kind of subject of world politics with which the other participants in international relations are forced to come to terms in one way or another. Its impact is reflected primarily in such important spheres of international life as East-West relations, North-South relations and also interimperialist rivalry.

Such facts as participation in the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the elaboration of a common position on the Near East conflict and the publication of a number of policy documents reflecting the position of the community countries on this international issue or the other testify, inter alia, to the EEC's growing role. "If we proceed from the criteria of evaluation of the foreign policy of an individual state, the community's international activity," the author writes, "cannot be seen as a uniform foreign policy. But if it is seen as the result of coordination of the foreign policy of the member-states, there is reason to state that... the mechanism of coordination of foreign policy courses has been perfected" (pp 314-315).

The international-political activity of the EEC has, as the book observes, intensified markedly since the start of the 1970's. The number of states with which diplomatic and commercial relations have been established is increasing and the range of problems on which it acts from common positions (the American-Iranian crisis, the Near East conflict and others) is broadening.

A considerable place in the book is occupied by questions of the community's relations with the United States, which have in practice been a reflection of the struggle between the "Atlantic" and "European" trends. The United States has endeavored to strengthen its influence on the West European countries via NATO, intimidating the allies with the "Soviet threat" and justifying its claims to leadership by the tasks of confrontation with the socialist countries. However, the American efforts have been unable to prevent a certain "distancing" of the EEC countries from Washington and their adoption of relatively independent positions, particularly in respect of problems of maintaining political dialogue and economic relations with the Soviet Union.

In some cases the West European partners' demonstration of "Atlantic solidarity" is of an outward, formal nature. Considerable influence on the community's position is exerted, as the book shows, by the struggle of the democratic forces in West Europe against the reactionary imperialist plans of the monopoly bourgeoisie.

The author rightly asserts that the endeavor of "certain Western circles to use the community as an instrument of policy hostile to the socialist countries... is an impediment in the West European states' implementation of an independent course corresponding to their national interests" (p 414). We would note in this connection that importance for neutralization of the antisocialist aspirations of certain circles of "Little Europe" is attached to the constructive peace-loving initiatives of the Soviet Union.

The book also touches on problems of the extension of West European integration to the military sphere. Regardless of the intentions of its supporters, the possibility of the creation in West Europe of a new military grouping would mean, the author believes, an intensification of the arms race and a disturbance of the correlation of forces in Europe, which would complicate even more the equal security of European states and the continent's stability (p 415).

Not all questions are illustrated in the work sufficiently fully. Thus more attention, we believe, should have been paid to political aspects of the community's relations with Japan, the PRC and the developing countries. We also believe that a publication aimed primarily at the foreign reader should have mentioned, if only briefly, together with the critical analysis of the vast amount of Western literature on the subject, the main directions of scientific study of the corresponding problems in the Soviet Union.

As a whole, however, the book in question undoubtedly merits a positive assessment.

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CSO: 1816/03

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26 February 1986

